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INTRODUCTION
The path walked by a well-meaning fiduciary is fraught with peril.
Trustees, lawyers, company directors, and other fiduciaries are
bedeviled by conflicts owed to multiple principals. Should an
attorney, for example, violate one client’s trust by disclosing
information that could result in the acquittal of another client
wrongly accused of a crime? Should a trustee continue to loan trust
assets to a company on which he serves as a director after learning
privately that the company is doomed? In these situations, the
fiduciary is faced with a challenging dilemma. He can respect the
wishes of one principal, but in doing so, he may fail to perform his
duty to another. How should a fiduciary resolve such a conflict?
The principal debate attending fiduciary duties over the past
twenty-five years has sidestepped this question and focused on others
instead. A large body of literature contends that fiduciary duties are
barnacles on the ship of contract, default contractual terms to which
the parties would agree if they had the benefit of unlimited
1
resources. While this debate helps place fiduciary duties under the
1. See generally ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, PARTNERSHIP § 6.07(a), at
6.110-111 (Aspen Publishers Supp. 2003-2) (1988) (explaining that “[f]iduciary
duties are essentially part of the standard form contract that governs partnership in
the absence of contrary agreement”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 427 (1993) (describing the fiduciary
relation as contractual and subject to high costs of specification and monitoring);
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J.
698, 702 (1982) (theorizing that investors and agents would bargain for fiduciary
rules if an agreement on such rules could be made at no cost); John H. Langbein,
The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 629 (1995) (purporting
that fiduciary duties in trust law are “unambiguously contractarian” despite the desire
to hold fiduciary obligations sacred); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the
Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary
Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 28 (1991) (claiming that fiduciary duties are a legal
construct which fill in the unspecified terms of shareholders’ contingent contracts);
Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder
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rubric of contract law, it does not address conflicts between and
among principals faced by fiduciaries. A related body of literature
has evolved surrounding the source of the fiduciary relationship.
Many commentators have argued that fiduciary relationships arise
from a grant of power or authority from the principal to the fiduciary
2
to act on the principal’s behalf. While this discussion helps to
account for when fiduciary duties arise, it does not address how to
resolve conflicts of duties owed to multiple principals.
This Article attempts to fill the gap and presents an account for
how courts decide such cases. It demonstrates that one can best
understand the way courts resolve these conflicts by analyzing the
nature or character of the particular duties imposed. This Article will
Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266, 1273 (1999)
(concluding that fiduciary duties are essentially contractual in nature). Other
commentators are critical of the contract model. See, e.g., Robert C. Clark, Agency
Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS
55, 63 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1991) (noting that courts have
failed to delineate how fiduciary duties fill in contractual gaps and ambiguities);
Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
767, 768 (2000) (noting that cognitive factors lead courts to analyze property-based
fiduciary relationships differently than contractual relationships); Victor Brudney,
Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595, 627 (1997)
(contrasting the neutral character of restrictions on opportunistic behavior imposed
by background contractual terms with fiduciary rules that are comprehensive and
one-sided); Deborah H. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation,
1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 889-90 (1988) (contending that “the ‘hypothetical bargain’ view
of fiduciary obligation does not help to explain the law”); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary
Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1266 (1995) (highlighting the
insufficiency of the contract model for fiduciary relationships because it relies on
trust); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425, 478
(1993) (challenging those who predicate the notion of fiduciary loyalty on efficiency
because such an explanation misses both the nature and importance of trust).
2. Fiduciary duties are said to arise as a constraint on opportunism presented to
the fiduciary by virtue of the power or authority he receives from the principal. See,
e.g., Alexander, supra note 1, at 774-75 (comparing the horizontal and the vertical
nature of non-fiduciary and fiduciary relationships); Victor Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology
in Transactions Affecting Corporate Control, 65 MICH. L. REV. 259, 275 (1966) (proposing
that the fiduciary ideology is a “prophylactic prohibition” where the opportunity to
benefit the trustee is large and unclear whether the beneficiary is deprived of
anything); Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1048 (1991)
(charging that the separation of ownership from control or management creates
opportunities for the agent to skim assets); Robert Flannigan, The Fiduciary Obligation,
9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 285, 295 n.46 (1989) (stating that the access to assets can
create fiduciary status because it provides the opportunity for abuse); Frankel, supra
note 1, at 1224 n.37 (explaining that fiduciary law is founded on the need to prevent
one person from misappropriating another person’s valuables); Tamar Frankel,
Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 825 (1983) (determining that the fiduciary duty
fluctuates according to the degree of potential abuse of power stemming from the
relation); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1399, 1444 (2002) (justifying the decision to impose fiduciary duties on the
ability of the fiduciary to act opportunistically); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary
Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 4 (1975) (characterizing the fiduciary obligation as
a “blunt tool” for the control of fiduciary discretion).
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show that the two main branches of fiduciary duty—the duty of
loyalty and the duty of care—differ in character. The duty of loyalty
is primarily a negative duty not to harm the principal, and it is
unambiguous in what it requires. The duty of care is positive—a duty
to promote the ends of the principal—and it is open-ended and variable in
nature. When duties of loyalty and care collide, courts generally
resolve the conflict in favor of the duty of loyalty representing
minimum conduct to which the fiduciary must adhere.
The central thrust of the Article is explanatory. Courts deciding
conflicts of duty cases in many areas of fiduciary law base their
decisions on theories or doctrines applied on an ad hoc basis.
Underlying the cases is a tension between promoting the duty of
loyalty or the duty of care, but not both. In each case, courts resolve
the tension by enforcing the duty of loyalty to one principal even if it
results in a diminution in the duty of care to another. Once this
principle is uncovered, the cohesiveness of the cases becomes clear.
They are decided on a rational basis consistently applied. This
Article’s objective is to explain that conflict of duty cases—regardless
of the type of fiduciary involved—are coherent at their core.
To assist in this explanation, I trace the differences between the
duty of loyalty and the duty of care to Immanuel Kant’s discussion of
perfect and imperfect duties. Kant divided all duties into these two
categories, and the difference between them illuminates the
difference between the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. An
examination of fiduciary duties in light of Kant’s perfect and
imperfect duties is absent from both the legal and philosophical
literature. I explore this analogy and conclude that comparing
Kant’s perfect and imperfect duties with the fiduciary’s duties of
loyalty and care helps explain and justify why courts treat breaches of
the duty of care more leniently than breaches of the duty of loyalty.
And it provides the key to resolving conflicts of duty in favor of the
duty of loyalty, not the duty of care.
Understanding the nature of loyalty and care in fiduciary
relationships, and how it bears on resolving conflicts of duty, is
important and timely. Many of our affairs are entrusted to fiduciaries
such as attorneys, investment professionals, company directors, and
others. The decisions they make on our behalf can govern our
health, affect our property, determine our retirement savings, and
influence our well-being in numerous other ways. In some areas,
such as corporate governance, the fiduciary’s role is undergoing
scrutiny and reevaluation. The numerous corporate failures and
mutual fund scandals in the United States have directed attention to
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the role of company boards and whether directors are performing
their duties adequately. Thus, while fiduciary duties historically have
3
evolved through the common law, in recent years, Congress, the
4
Securities and Exchange Commission, the American Bar
5
6
Association, and others are grappling with ways to minimize
breaches of fiduciary duty.
3. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 301, 402, 307, 116
Stat. 745 (2002) (regulating accounting, auditing, and corporate governance
extensively, including setting forth the requirements governing the responsibilities of
audit committees (§ 301), prohibiting loans to officers and directors of public
companies (§ 402), and requiring the reporting by lawyers of certain violations of law
(§ 307)).
4. See, e.g., Investment Adviser Code of Ethics, Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 2209, 69 Fed. Reg. 4040-01 (Jan. 27, 2004) (expressing concern that the
obligations of the duty of loyalty are lost on the growing number of advisers in the
enforcement calendar), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/ia2209.htm; Compliance Programs for Investment Companies and Investment
Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2204, 68 Fed. Reg. 74714-01 (Dec. 24,
2003) (noting that the rule requires advisers to consider their fiduciary duties under
the Advisers Act and to shape procedures to address them), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-2204.htm; Management’s Report on Internal
Controls Over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act
Periodic Reports, Securities Act Release No. 8238, 68 Fed. Reg. 36636-01 (June 18,
2003) (stating that the rule amendments are meant to improve disclosure about the
extent of management’s responsibility for financial statements, internal controls, and
means by which management discharges responsibilities), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8238.htm; Standards Relating to Listed Company
Audits, Securities Act Release No. 8220, 68 Fed. Reg. 18788-01 (Apr. 16, 2003)
(increasing the competence of audit committees to improve accountability and the
quality
of
financial
disclosure
and
oversight),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8220.htm; Implementation of Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 8185, 68 Fed. Reg.
6296-01 (Feb. 6, 2003) (observing that these requirements will make it more likely
that companies will address misconduct internally and remedy violations at earlier
stages), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm.
5. See American Bar Association, Report of the American Bar Association Task Force
on Corporate Responsibility, 59 BUS. LAW. 145, 147 (2003) (providing analysis and
recommendations to govern behavior “that conforms to law and results from the
proper exercise of fiduciary duties of care and loyalty”).
6. See, e.g., GEORGE BENSTON ET AL., FOLLOWING THE MONEY: THE ENRON FAILURE
AND THE STATE OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 49-80 (2003) (proposing ways to fix
corporate disclosure, such as incremental reforms, the formulation of a global
standard, innovative monitoring, and improved incentives); IRA M. MILLSTEIN & PAUL
W. MACAVOY, THE RECURRENT CRISIS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 114 (Palgrave
Macmillan 2004) (charging that board members recognize their duty to those who
count on their honesty, loyalty, and good faith for protection); Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Crisis in Confidence: Corporate Governance and Professional Ethics Post
Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 919-20 (2003) (endorsing Sarbanes-Oxley’s expanded
penal net, but criticizing Congress’s failure to take responsibility for its own
contribution to corporate mis-governance); Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering
Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 29 (2003) (reinforcing the
notion that loyalty should be central to corporate well-being, especially after Enron);
David Millon, Who “Caused” the Enron Debacle, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 309, 312 (2003)
(exploring the gatekeeper’s function and the relevance of causing liability to
minimizing breaches of fiduciary duties); Joseph T. Walsh, The Fiduciary Foundation of
Corporate Law, 27 J. CORP. L. 333, 339 (2002) (suggesting that Enron’s collapse may

LABY.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

80

2/4/2005 3:36:12 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:75

The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I begins with an overview
of the problem. It describes circumstances in which a fiduciary faces
a conflict and is left with no choice but to breach one duty in order to
perform another. Part I also discusses approaches to address such
conflicts and why the approaches do not explain consistently how
such cases have been resolved. Part II discusses how the twin duties
imposed in a fiduciary relationship—the duty of loyalty and the duty
of care—differ in character. The duty of loyalty is a duty of omission,
requiring the fiduciary to refrain from conduct harmful to the
principal. The duty of loyalty is an example of Kant’s perfect duties.
The duty of care is a duty of commission, requiring the fiduciary to
engage in conduct for the benefit of the principal. Yet no rule or set
of rules can fully describe the duty of care. Rather, the fiduciary must
make the well-being of the principal his goal and act accordingly.
The duty of care is an example of Kant’s imperfect duties. Part III
applies these principles to several cases and posits that such
principles, whether articulated or not, account for how the cases are
decided. Part III explains that when courts must determine whether
to enforce the duty of loyalty or the duty of care, they opt to enforce
the duty of loyalty. Negative duties triumph over positive ones; duties
of omission triumph over duties of commission.
I.

CONFLICTS OF DUTY

A fiduciary relationship is a relationship of trust and confidence
where one party (the principal) places control over her property or
affairs with another (the fiduciary), and the fiduciary agrees to act in
7
the principal’s benefit with respect to her property or affairs. Some
cause us to reexamine the public responsibility of private corporations and the
fiduciary duty of disclosure of corporate directors); Symposium, Van Gorkom and the
Corporate Board: Problem, Solution, or Placebo, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 447 (2002) (discussing
the Van Gorkom duty of care standard); Kurt Eichenwald, In String of Corporate
Troubles, Critics Focus on Boards’ Failings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2003, at A1 (questioning
whether members of corporate boards always work on their investors’ behalf); David
Gische & Jo Ann Abramson, Corporate Fiduciary Liability Claims in the Post-Enron Era, at
http://articles.corporate.findlaw.com/articles/file/00295/008474 (last visited Jan.
31, 2005) (stating that ERISA class action lawsuits against corporate directors for
breach of fiduciary duty are troubling because they (i) expand the definition of
fiduciary to include officers not directly responsible for plan assets, and (ii) impinge
on otherwise regulated fields, such as the disclosure of financial performance) (on
file with the American University Law Review).
7. A general comprehensive definition of fiduciary does not seem to exist. See
Weinrib, supra note 2, at 5 (stating that the designation of a company’s fiduciary is a
“notoriously intractable problem”). In fact, courts often are reluctant to define
“fiduciary” to avoid the negative implication that relationships not included in the
definition are excluded. See, e.g., Harper v. Adametz, 113 A.2d 136, 139 (Conn.
1955) (declining to define a fiduciary relationship in precise detail). The definition
of “fiduciary” in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS is circular in part, and it leaves
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fiduciary relationships are well established; other relationships may
give rise to fiduciary duties depending on the facts and circumstances
8
of a particular situation. In all cases, fiduciaries can face conflicts
between and among multiple principals the moment they agree to
act on behalf of more than one. Part I presents the existence of such
conflicts and the manner in which they are purportedly resolved.
A. The Problem
Most fiduciaries act for more than one principal. A trustee
generally administers more than one trust; an attorney represents
more than one client; a company director may sit on multiple boards.
The Second Restatement of Agency provides, unless agreed, that an
9
agent may not act for persons whose interests may conflict. But the
Restatement also recognizes that some conflicts may not be
foreseeable, and an agent may act for principals with conflicting

unanswered the question of when a fiduciary duty arises. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
§ 874 cmt. a (1977) (defining a fiduciary relation as one that exists between
two persons when one person is under a duty to act for the benefit of the other).
Other courts also have expressed the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of
formulating a definition of fiduciary to capture all cases. See Steelvest, Inc. v.
Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 485 (Ky. 1991) (stressing the impossibility
of formulating a definition of a fiduciary relationship that would fully and adequately
embrace all cases); Brown v. Foulks, 657 P.2d 501, 506 (Kan. 1983) (stating that it is
difficult to define the term “fiduciary relation”). A large body of literature has
emerged addressing the characteristics of the fiduciary relationship. See generally
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 504 (1996) (identifying the primary function of
the fiduciary duty as the constraint on exercising discretionary powers); Flannigan,
supra note 2, at 297 (explicating that trust is a single source of the obligation); Tamar
Frankel & Wendy Gordon, Trust Relationships, 81 B.U. L. REV. 321, 323-24 (1981)
(highlighting the role of trust in fiduciary relationships); Weinrib, supra note 2, at 7
(identifying the hallmark of a fiduciary relation as one person’s commitment to
another).
8. Conventional fiduciary relationships include trustee and beneficiary, attorney
and client, guardian and ward, executor and heir, and director and shareholder.
Examples of unconventional fiduciary relationships are stockbroker and customer,
accountant and client, and director and bondholder. See, e.g., Flannigan, supra note
2, at 293-94 (noting that a fiduciary relationship is established where confidence or
deferential trust is shown to exist); see also Cheryl Goss Weiss, A Review of the Historic
Foundations of Broker-Dealer Liability for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 23 J. CORP. L. 65, 112-14
(1997) (examining whether brokers are fiduciaries). Others use the terms formal
and informal in place of conventional and unconventional. See Smith, supra note 2,
at 1412 & n.51 (labeling trustee-beneficiary, guardian-ward, partner-partner,
director-shareholder, and attorney-client relationships as formal and general
confidential relationships as informal); see also DeMott, supra note 1, at 909
(discussing the unconventional aspect of fiduciary relationships).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 394 (1958); see also N.L.R.B. v. Amax
Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329-30 (1981) (arguing that the rule against a trustee
dividing his loyalties must be rigidly enforced to deter the trustee from all temptation
and to prevent any possible injury to the beneficiary).

OF TORTS
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interests if the agent did not intend to create a situation where a
10
conflict may arise.
In what kinds of cases would a conflict between legitimate interests
arise? A fiduciary that offers even one service, such as a trustee or
advisory service, may encounter conflicts the moment representation
of multiple principals occurs. Some of these conflicts present
questions over how to allocate scarce resources.
Some have
questioned whether a director who sits on eighty or one hundred
11
boards can effectively monitor the activity of each. Similarly, one
can ask if an attorney with multiple clients should spend time
preparing one case over another. An investment manager may be
required to place a valuable investment in the account of one client
and not another. The same investment manager may also have to sell
an illiquid security from several accounts, driving the price of that
security down. Determining which clients sell first, therefore,
12
presents a conflict.
Perhaps the clearest problem arises when a
trustee sells assets from one account to another. In that case, the
trustee is both purchaser and seller. As seller, the trustee seeks to sell
13
dear, and as buyer, to buy low. A company director in the case of a
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 394 cmt. b (1958). I shall not, in this
Part, address conflicts of interest that arise when a fiduciary is motivated by selfinterest. Much of fiduciary law, explored more fully in Part II, is based on how to
ensure a fiduciary does not take advantage of opportunities for self-dealing. The
focus here, rather, is limited to situations where two or more principals have
legitimate interests and the fiduciary is placed in the delicate role of determining
which interest prevails. This problem facing the fiduciary may be characterized as a
distinction between conflicts of interest and conflicts of duty. How can one blame a
fiduciary in an untenable situation wanting to do the right thing? Put this way, the
focus is on the intent of the fiduciary as opposed to the consequences of the
fiduciary’s actions. It is little comfort to the fiduciary’s principal, however, that the
fiduciary is not acting out of self-interest but rather in the interest of another
principal. This debate arises in the context of criminal law as well. See generally
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON
TRIAL 60-83 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1990) (1988) (discussing Goetz’s choice to shoot
four men on the subway in light of his intent and the consequences of his actions).
11. Mutual Funds: Trading Practices and Abuses That Harm Investors: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security of the Senate
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-4 (2003) (statement of Senator
Collins).
12. See generally AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRACHTER, THE LAW
OF TRUSTS §§ 169, 170 (4th ed. 1987 & Supp. 2000) (indicating that the most
fundamental duty of trustee is the duty of loyalty owed to the beneficiaries of a trust
and the duty of the trustee is to administer the trust for the sole interest of the
beneficiaries).
13. The Uniform Trusts Act expressly forbids this practice. See UNIF. TRUSTS ACT
§ 6 (1937) (forbidding the trustee of one trust from selling property to itself as the
trustee of another trust). Most states, however, permit such transfers as long as the
price is considered fair. See GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 543 (H) (1993) (noting that most states adopt a middle ground
approach, where the transaction is unassailable by the beneficiaries unless there is
unfairness); SCOTT & FRACHTER, supra note 12, at § 170.6 (forbidding straw
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self-tender has a similar conflict because he represents both the
company conducting the offer and the shareholders to whom the
14
offer is directed. Striking a proper balance may be difficult.
In other cases, striking a proper balance may be impossible. Some
fiduciaries face conflicts whereby acting to the benefit of one
15
principal necessarily harms another. These cases may be considered
strict conflicts because the fiduciary has a reason to take the action,
but the same fiduciary also has a reason to refrain from taking the
16
same action.
Consider the example of a defense attorney
representing two codefendants, both of whom claim they were not
present at the scene of a crime. A prosecution eyewitness testifies to
seeing both individuals at the crime scene, but the witness’s memory
is weaker with respect to the second. The defense attorney is in a
bind. Attempts to impeach the witness’s testimony with respect to the
second defendant will call attention to the fact that the witness’s
testimony with respect to the first is sound. Should the defense
attorney question the witness and attempt to impeach or forgo crossexamination?
While representation of multiple principals may cause conflicts for
a fiduciary that offers a unitary service, conflicts are more likely to
17
arise when a fiduciary offers multiple services to multiple clients.
Organizations enhance their efficiency by offering multiple services,
and courts recognize that large financial firms have done so for
18
decades.
The activities of many financial firms can be divided
transactions if they involve a third person, but not if they involve a fiduciary
operating alone); Fiduciary Activities of National Banks Regulations, 12 C.F.R.
§ 9.12(d) (1996) (allowing a national bank serving as fiduciary to sell assets between
fiduciary accounts if the transaction is fair and not prohibited by applicable law).
14. See Eisenberg v. Chi. Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1057 (Del. Ch. 1987)
(explaining that directors act as both the representatives of the corporation and the
fiduciaries for the shareholder-offerees, giving rise to potential conflict on the part of
the directors).
15. But cf. JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 188 (2002) (proposing that
conflicts need not be mutually exclusive).
16. See id. at 25, 188 (postulating that conflicts of reason, which occur when the
agent has reasons to perform and not to perform a certain act, should not necessarily
preclude the pursuit of that act).
17. See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND STEERING COMMITTEE ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
IN THE SECURITIES MARKETS, ABUSE ON WALL STREET: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE
SECURITIES MARKETS 7 (1980) (noting that modern firms perform a “multiplicity” of
functions, such as the execution of orders to buy and sell stocks, buy and sell bonds,
provide investment advice, and underwrite new issues, which further complicate
conflicts of interest); Note, Conflicting Duties of Brokerage Firms, 88 HARV. L. REV. 396,
420 (1974) (recommending a system where the fiduciary, upon entering a
confidential relationship, notifies customers that previous recommendations from an
outside perspective will no longer be updated).
18. See In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 272 F. Supp.
2d 243, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that the affiliation between mutual fund
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roughly into two categories, investment banking and retail brokerage,
and the cyclical nature of revenue from brokerage often is offset by
19
Offering
more consistent revenues from investment banking.
multiple services, however, may present tensions in the organization
20
and lead to conflicts between and among customers and clients. A
firm that both underwrites securities and provides brokerage services,
for example, faces competing claims of its clients. Over forty years
ago, the SEC noted that the variety of functions performed by
securities firms—including underwriting and retail brokerage—
results in “multifarious possibilities of conflict of obligation or
interest” since “each of these functions involves its own set of
21
obligations to particular persons or groups of persons.”
These
conflicts are as salient today as they were in 1963. The New Yorker
recently noted:
The overriding conflict is that most major firms . . . run both
investment banks and brokerages. Investment bankers help
companies sell stocks and bonds. Brokers help investors buy stocks
and bonds. Companies want to sell high, investors want to buy low.
Companies want Wall Street to make them look good, investors
want Wall Street to tell them which companies actually are good.
When the same firm is advising both sides, someone is going to get
22
a raw deal, even if everyone is acting honestly.

Recent federal and state actions against Jack Grubman, Henry
Blodget, and ten large investment firms demonstrate conflicts that
23
exist in financial firms.
The investment banks exercised
extraordinary and inappropriate influence over research analysts
24
whose job it was to be objective seers of the facts.
investment advisers and broker-dealers has been recognized for decades).
19. JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 214 (3d
ed. 2001).
20. See NORMAN S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION 31-38 (1995)
(chronicling the potential conflicts of interest that arise in a multi-function financial
firm).
21. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF
SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. DOC. NO. 95, pt. I, at 439 (1st Sess. 1963) (discussing the
emerging pitfalls in directorships and broker-dealer trading and calling for “vigilant
concern for niceties of conduct”).
22. James Surowiecki, In Wall Street We Trust, THE NEW YORKER, May 26, 2003 at
40.
23. See, e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 2841, 2004 WL 2075173
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2004) (detailing the case against Jack Grubman); In re Merrill
Lynch & Co., Inc. Research Reports Sec., No. 01 Civ. 6881, 2004 WL 305601
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2004) (detailing the case against Henry Blodget).
24. The SEC and the New York Attorney General alleged that the investment
banking departments of ten large firms exercised improper influence over research
to curry favor with certain companies and to generate investment banking business.
See Joint Press Release, SEC, New York Attorney General, North American Securities
Administrators Association, NYSE and NASD, Ten of Nation’s Top Investment Firms
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Conflicts of duty can also arise when a company director takes on
the function of a trustee, and trust assets are invested in the
25
The director-trustee may face tough
company’s stock or debt.
choices between taking risk-enhancing steps to increase the price of
the stock, thereby promoting the well-being of the company
shareholders, and refraining from taking such steps to ensure the
well-being of the trust beneficiaries, who typically are risk-averse.
Similarly, a company officer may act as a trustee to a company
pension plan and face similar conflicts between a duty to the
26
company’s shareholders and a duty to the plan members.
Perhaps the most typical conflict results from the fiduciary’s duty of
27
confidentiality. Certain services, such as banking, trust, or advisory
services, place a high value on client confidentiality, while other
services, such as underwriting or brokerage, require detailed
disclosure. A fiduciary offering two or more of these services may be
pressed to disclose information to one client that another insists be
kept confidential.
An attorney, for example, may learn of
confidential information through the course of representation of one
28
client that is vital to the representation of another.
Similarly, a
Settle Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and
Investment Banking (Apr. 28, 2003) (summarizing the charges against the ten firms
and introducing reforms to insure that the ties between brokerage and investment
banking will be permanently severed), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2003-54.htm; see also Federal Court Approves Global Analyst Research Settlement,
SEC Litig. Release No. 18438, 81 SEC Docket 1699, 1699 (Oct. 31, 2003)
(summarizing the allegations of the SEC’s complaint and the terms of the
settlement, wherein the firms agreed to pay approximately $1.4 billion and
implement structural reforms), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/
lr18438.htm.
25. See Note, The Trust Corporation: Dual Fiduciary Duties and the Conflict of
Institutions, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 713, 717 (1961) (explaining that when two institutions
share a common fiduciary a breach of duty is likely to occur because an act on behalf
of one institution may not be in the best interests of the other).
26. Section 408(c)(3) of ERISA permits a company officer to act as a trustee for
an ERISA pension plan, Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
§ 408(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (2004), but section 404(a)(1) provides that the
plan must be administered “for the exclusive purpose of . . . providing benefits to
participants and their beneficiaries.” See Siskind v. Sperry Retirement Program, 47
F.3d 498, 500 (2d Cir. 1995) (observing the appearance of a conflict of interest when
ERISA trustees hold corporate offices); Donovan v. Bierwith, 538 F. Supp. 463, 46869 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (discussing the duties owed by a pension fund trustee who is also
a company director, and the extent to which ERISA permits this overlap), aff’d, 680
F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1982) (Friendly, J.). See generally David I. Weiss, Conflicts of Interest
Arising Under ERISA’s Fiduciary Standards: Can the Trustee Ever be Prudent, as Long as He
Faces Dual Loyalties?, 9 NOVA L.J. 413, 413 (1985) (criticizing the enactment of §
408(c)(3) of ERISA, which permits corporate officers to act as trustees for pension
plans, and thus, allows the exposure of ERISA pension plans to loss of funds at the
hands of disloyal corporate officers/trustees).
27. See generally Mitchell, supra note 2, at 478 (stressing that fiduciary
relationships are based on trust and loyalty).
28. See Lauren Cohen, Note, In-House Counsel and the Attorney-Client Privilege: How
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company director serving on multiple boards may learn of
confidential information from one that would be beneficial to
29
another. Our instincts tell us that the director should keep the
information of the first confidential, but why is this the case if doing
30
so does a disservice to the second? A company director who serves
as a trustee and invests trust assets in the company’s shares similarly
may be privy to non-public information bearing on the price of the
shares. If the trustee learns that the company is doomed, is the
trustee duty-bound to sell? Is selling the shares permitted, but not
required?
B. Approaches to Addressing Conflicts of Duty
Current law has taken several approaches to resolving conflicts of
duty, none of which is wholly satisfactory. Five possible approaches,
which find expression in the case law, are (i) balancing the interests;
(ii) applying a property theory; (iii) applying the doctrine of actio
libera in causa; (iv) determining which duty arose first; and (v) seeking
the advice of a neutral third party to settle the conflict. On occasion,
two or more of these approaches are employed.
1.

Balancing the interests
One approach to resolve a conflict of duty is to examine two
interests, imagine placing them on a scale, and determine which is
weightier. The determination may turn on a number of factors,
including the principals’ circumstances and the effects of a breach,
but in any case the approach is subjective and depends on the weight
the decision-maker assigns to the respective interests. One might
assume, for example, that if a court were to weigh the interest of a
potentially innocent person from being wrongly convicted, on the
one hand, and the interest of a deceased person in maintaining
confidentiality, on the other, the scale would tilt in favor of the
potentially innocent defendant. But that is not the case.
Sarbanes-Oxley Misses the Point, 9 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 297, 316-17 (2004) (stating that
ethical issues exist for lawyers with regard to confidentiality, conflicts of interest, and
independence).
29. See Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No.
26323, 69 Fed. Reg. 3472-01, 3473-01 (Jan. 15, 2004) (questioning whether it would
be appropriate, in the context of mutual funds, to restrict the number of boards on
which a director serves to reduce the dissemination of confidential information),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/ic-26323.htm.
30. See John K. Wells, Multiple Directorships: The Fiduciary Duties and Conflicts of
Interest that Arise When One Individual Serves More Than One Corporation, 33 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 561, 568-69 (2000) (explaining that directors of two corporations must
consider what acts are in the best interest of both companies).
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Some courts will go to great lengths to protect attorney-client
31
In Arizona v.
confidentiality in the face of competing interests.
32
Macumber, the defendant was found guilty of murder and sentenced
to life imprisonment. During his defense, Macumber’s attorney
sought to introduce evidence of a confession that another person,
who in the meantime had died, had committed the same crime for
33
which Macumber was being tried. The trial court, however, refused
34
to admit the evidence on the grounds that it was privileged.
Macumber appealed and the Arizona Supreme Court believed that
the interests at stake had been weighed by the legislature, which
35
determined that confidentiality was more important.
The court
recognized that maintaining confidentiality would result in an
injustice, but it believed the legislature considered this consequence
36
when it balanced the interests. In the end, the court reversed the
37
conviction on other grounds, but it opted to maintain the

31. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (claiming that the
attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential
communications in the common law); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS
242 (1986) (highlighting attorney-client confidentiality as a central tenet of the
attorney-client relationship in common law countries and in every state in the United
States); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2000) (justifying the
privilege on numerous policy grounds, such as facilitating fact development in a
dispute necessary for the proper representation of the client and encouraging
otherwise reticent clients to seek legal advice); Susan R. Martyn, In Defense of ClientLawyer Confidentiality . . . and its Exceptions, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1320, 1323-30 (2003)
(advancing utilitarian and deontological justifications for the privilege).
32. 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976).
33. Macumber’s attorney did not represent the deceased, and therefore, did not
face a direct conflict between maintaining the confidentiality of the deceased and
acting on behalf of his client. Id. at 1086. The deceased instead had been
represented previously by two attorneys who were present for Macumber’s trial. Id.
The attorneys were willing to testify for Macumber that their client previously had
confessed to the murders for which Macumber was accused. Id.
34. See id. (holding that only the client, or an authorized person of the client,
may claim the privilege, and that another person may assert the privilege only where
the privileged person is absent).
35. Id. The court first established that absent a waiver, an attorney may not be
examined about any attorney-client communication, even if the client is deceased.
Id. Next, the court held that under the circumstances of this case, waiver by the
client’s attorney was insufficient. Id. It is still the case that the attorney-client
privilege survives the death of the client. While in some cases a personal
representative, such as an executor, may waive the privilege on behalf of the client,
those cases are generally limited to circumstances to benefit the estate and where the
client, if alive, would readily consent to waiver. See Mayorga v. Tate, 752 N.Y.S.2d
353, 353-56 (App. Div. 2002) (noting that the right to waive one’s interest in a
deceased client’s estate survives the death of the client, and may be exercised by the
decedent’s personal representative, in much the same way that the attorney-client
privilege survives the death of the client for whose benefit the privilege exists).
36. Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1086.
37. See id. (holding that the trial court erroneously excluded expert testimony
offered by defendant).
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confidentiality of the dead client and bar the evidence of the
confession.
In the famous case of Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
38
California, the court took the same approach by employing a
balancing test to justify disclosure. In that case, the court had to
resolve a conflict between two legal duties owed by a therapist: the
duty to a patient to maintain confidentiality and the duty to a
39
potential victim to prevent harm. The court recognized the public
interest in safeguarding confidential communications between a
psychotherapist and patient, but it stated, “Against this interest,
however, we must weigh the public interest in safety from violent
assault. The Legislature has undertaken the difficult task of
40
balancing the countervailing concerns.”
The court ruled that
confidentiality had to yield to the extent that that disclosure was
41
necessary to avert danger to others. While Tarasoff is not strictly a
conflict of fiduciary duties, it illustrates the use of a balancing test to
decide difficult cases.
Determining which interest is weightier is subjective. Soft interests
such as preserving confidentiality or preventing injustice are not
readily quantifiable.
Assigning weights to such interests is
tantamount to adopting a conclusion during what is supposed to be a
process for reaching one. In fact, Justice Holohan in Macumber
believed that the scales tilted in favor of breaching confidentiality in
furtherance of Macumber’s defense. Justice Holohan also claimed to
weigh the competing interests, but he determined that the interest in
presenting a defense outweighed the interest in confidentiality. He
argued that “[t]he problem of balancing competing interests,
privilege versus a proper defense, is a difficult one, but the balance
always weighs in favor of achieving a fair determination of the
42
cause.” Justice Holohan stated that a claim of privilege “may have to
give way when faced with the necessity of the accused to present a
43
defense.”
The approaches of both the majority and concurring opinions in
Macumber are unappealing. If applied generally, Holohan’s approach
would create significant exceptions to the attorney-client privilege
because an attorney could always claim that disclosure of one client’s
confidentiality was necessary to achieve a “fair determination of the
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
Id. at 345-46.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 347.
Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1088 (Holohan, J., concurring).
Id.
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cause.” But while Holohan’s approach is not satisfactory, one has a
negative reaction to the majority opinion as well.
It seems
preposterous that the statement of the deceased should be excluded
and that, as a result, Macumber could have been convicted of crimes
he did not commit. Like the innocent priest in Alfred Hitchcock’s “I
Confess,” who faced conviction because he was unwilling to break the
44
seal of confession, in Macumber, a potentially innocent defendant
faced conviction as well.
2.

Applying a property theory
In weighing the interests in Macumber, Justice Holohan also
invoked a property theory. Holohan stated that once the client had
died, he could not be prosecuted for other crimes, and any privilege
45
was “merely a matter of property interest.” He went on to say that
opposed to the property interest is the “vital interest” of the accused
in defending himself. Holohan argued that “the constitutional right
of the accused to present a defense should prevail over the property
46
interest of a deceased client in keeping his disclosures private.”
Invoking a property theory, however, suffers from several infirmities
in this context. First, it is unclear why the property interest
articulated by Justice Holohan should be any less important than a
constitutional interest. The United States Constitution places a value
on property as well. The just compensation clause of the Fifth
47
Amendment is evidence of that valuation, as is the contracts clause
48
Second, determining when a property
in Article I, Section 10.
interest exists, like a balancing test, is subjective and conclusory.
Labeling an interest “property” is a legal conclusion, not a basis for
the conclusion. While familiar to judges and lawyers steeped in the
common law, property is simply a term used to represent a set of
49
interests that merit protection.
44. I CONFESS (Alfred Hitchcock 1953).
45. Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1088.
46. Id.; see Roberta Romano, Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, “Contract and
Fiduciary Duty,” 36 J.L. & ECON. 447, 448-49 (1993) (discussing a property theory of
fiduciary duties).
47. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
48. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; LAURENCE TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 10-11
(1985) (noting a constitutional commitment to the institution of property and its
contractual expectations); see also Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to
Justice Found., 94 F.3d 996, 1000 (5th Cir. 1996) (declaring that property is defined
by state law and protected against the government by the Constitution);
CHRISTOPHER M. DUNCAN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS AND EARLY AMERICAN POLITICAL
THOUGHT 44 (1995) (stating that historically property merited protection as a means
by which an individual entered the public realm and as a source of independence
and citizenship).
49. See RESTATEMENT OF PROP. Ch. 1, introductory note (1936) (giving an even
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Not surprisingly, therefore, the presence of a property interest
does not lead to a particular conclusion and can be used to justify
different results in a single case. A court can view property as the less
important interest compared to other values such as justice or
fairness. If that is the case, once a court designates a property
interest, it can rule, as Justice Holohan did in the Macumber case, that
the interest in “mere property” ought to be ignored. Alternatively, if
a property interest is viewed as more important than other
considerations, the presence or absence of property will cause a court
to rule for or against a party. This was the result in Siskind v. Sperry
50
Retirement Program, which involved dual fiduciary duties under the
51
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). In that
case, plan trustees for the Sperry Retirement Program also were
corporate officers and excluded plan participants from an early
52
retirement incentive program in the course of a merger. The court
stated that the employees had no “property right” in the plan and
53
their fiduciary duties were not violated. Other than referring to the
employer’s discretion in creating additional benefits under the plan,
however, the court did not explain why no property right existed, or
why the employer’s discretion was determinative.
Conflicts of duty over whether to disclose confidential information
may also be resolved by deeming the information property worthy of
protection. The Supreme Court, in an insider trading case, held that
54
confidential information is a “species of property.” This theory was
determinative in settling a conflict of duty in Cotton v. Merrill, Lynch,
55
Pierce, Fenner & Smith. In that case, a financial firm, through an
investment banking relationship, received positive confidential
information about a company, but failed to disclose the information
broader definition to the term property to include “legal relations between persons”
with respect to tangible and intangible things); 73 C.J.S. Property § 4 (1983) (stating,
“In legal usage the word ‘property’ . . . may signify either the subjective matter in
which rights or interests exist, or it may signify valuable rights and interests protected
by law, or it may signify both . . . .”); see also Metro. Opera Ass’n, Inc. v. WagnerNichols Recorder Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 493 (1950) (explaining that “property
rights” should be thought of as legal conclusions because they are protected from the
intrusion of others by the courts); Gareth Jones, Unjust Enrichment and the Fiduciary’s
Duty of Loyalty, 84 LAW Q. REV. 472, 485 (1968) (analyzing Phipps v. Boardman, 2 A.C.
46 (H.L. 1967), and stating that distinguishing between “property” and “equitable
property” does not solve the question of whether the parties were unjustly enriched).
50. 47 F.3d 498 (2d Cir. 1995).
51. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1461 (2004).
52. Siskind, 47 F.3d at 507.
53. Id.
54. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987) (holding that
confidential information acquired or compiled by a corporation is a species of
property to which the corporation has the exclusive right and benefit).
55. 699 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Okla. 1988).
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56

to investors before they sold their shares. The court held that the
plaintiffs could not prove the firm breached a duty, stating that the
confidential information was the firm’s property and could not be
57
shared. But calling the interest property and worthy of protection
does not address why the investor-clients of the firm should be
denied access to the information to which they believed they were
entitled. Why was the firm not depriving the investors of their
property interest as well?
3.

Determining the actio libera in causa
A third approach used to resolve a conflict of duties is to examine
whether the fiduciary, attempting to escape blame for a breach of
duty, inappropriately created the situation giving rise to a conflict. If
the fiduciary claims that there was no choice but to engage in what is
normally culpable conduct, a court may reject the claim if the
fiduciary caused the conditions of this defense.
A common
illustration of causing the condition of one’s own defense is the
intoxicated actor who commits a crime. The defendant argues that
the crime occurred while the defendant was intoxicated, and
therefore, the defendant’s mental state is similar to that of a person
who is insane or incompetent. The difference, of course, is that the
intoxicated actor is responsible for being intoxicated or, in other
58
words, responsible for being inculpable. The action (in this case
56. Id. at 256.
57. Id. (quoting Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 26). The case was brought as a private
action alleging that Merrill Lynch handled the sale of the plaintiffs’ stock in a
company called United Energy Resources shortly before United Energy merged with
Midcon Corporation, which caused the share price to rise. Id. at 253. The decision
does not specify whether the trades were solicited or unsolicited, although use of the
phrase “handled the sale” suggests that the transactions were not solicited. Id. The
plaintiffs alleged that Merrill Lynch knew about the pending merger because it was
also a financial advisor to both United Energy and Midcon, but failed to disclose to
the plaintiffs material information about the merger. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that
Merrill breached its fiduciary duty by defrauding the investors with respect to their
sale of United Energy stock. Id. The court stated that “courts have established that
brokers have a primary obligation not to reveal inside information to clients for the
clients’ benefit in trading securities.” Id. at 256. The court concluded that even if it
assumed the existence of “conflicting fiduciary obligations, there can be no doubt
which is primary here.” Id. (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release
No. 6668, 40 SEC Docket 907, 916 (Nov. 8, 1961)). The presence of a property
interest assumes additional importance where one can claim—as the court did
here—that disclosure could lead to prosecution for depriving others of their
property. Id.
58. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One’s Own Defense, 71 VA.
L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1985) (noting that most jurisdictions do not allow an intoxication
defense when the defendant chose to become intoxicated); cf. Dr. Heinz-Dietrich,
Epilepsy Its Place as a Legal Defense, 16 MED. & L. 413, 416 (1997) (explaining that an
epileptic who suffers an epileptic attack while driving and causes harm may defend
losing control of the vehicle so long as the epileptic was not aware of the condition
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committing a crime) was free in its origin or free in its cause—actio
libera in causa—and therefore culpable, even if not free in its
59
execution.
It is easy to see the role this doctrine can play in conflict of duty
cases. A fiduciary, who creates a situation where a conflict has arisen,
may seek to avoid culpability for a breach of duty to one principal by
arguing that there was no choice but to breach the duty. One could
argue, however, that the fiduciary is blameworthy for creating the
situation in the first place. Thus, one way to resolve a conflict of duty
is to bar a defense to a breach of duty claim if the defense is based on
actions taken at an earlier time that could have been avoided. The
actor will not be permitted to defend an allegedly culpable act by
arguing that a breach of duty to one of the principals was inevitable.
Courts seem to take this approach in a line of cases involving
financial firms. In the California case Black v. Shearson, Hammill &
60
Company, the issue was whether a brokerage firm that had material
negative non-public information about a company, because a
member of the firm sat on the company’s board, was required to
disclose the information to brokerage customers investing in the
61
company’s shares. The firm argued it should not be liable for nondisclosure because it had a fiduciary duty to the company client not
62
to reveal confidential information. The court ruled that it lacked
sufficient reason “for permitting a person to avoid one fiduciary
before the attack occurred).
59. See Leo Katz, Before and After: Temporal Anomalies in Legal Doctrine, 151 U. PA.
L. REV. 863, 880-81 (2003) (explicating the problem in a criminal law context where
prohibitions require a specific intent and positing a paradoxical example where an
actor may be able to bring about his desired end but avoid the prerequisites for
liability); see also LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND
KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW 30-32 (1996) (analogizing the problem with a person
who buys a painting he dislikes just so he may destroy it).
60. 72 Cal. Rptr. 157 (Ct. App. 1968).
61. The brokerage firm, Shearson, had a partner named Dunbar, who also was a
director of United States Automatic Merchandising Company (USAMCO). Id. at
158. As part of its efforts to sell USAMCO shares, Shearson distributed press releases
and reports containing positive representations about the company’s operations. Id.
at 159. Some investors even were told that Dunbar’s service on USAMCO’s board
put Shearson in a position to receive inside information. Id. Since Dunbar failed to
disclose negative information to Shearson personnel, Shearson’s brokers continued
to reiterate positive representations to its customers even after the situation at
USAMCO was bleak. Id.
62. “The essence of the argument is that, as between [the member’s] conflicting
duties, the duty of confidentiality he owed to [the company] as a director was higher
than the duty he owed to Shearson’s customers as their broker.” Id. at 161. In
support of its argument, Shearson cited, and the court considered, a New York Stock
Exchange Educational Circular, which exhorted those in Dunbar’s position to
“meticulously avoid any disclosure of inside information to his partners, employees
of the firm, his customers or his research or trading departments.” Id. (citing NEW
YORK STOCK EXCHANGE EDUCATIONAL CIRCULAR NO. 162 (June 22, 1962)).
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obligation by accepting another which conflicts with it.” The court
continued, “The officer-director’s conflict in duties is the classic
problem encountered by one who serves two masters. It should not
be resolved by weighing the conflicting duties; it should be avoided in
64
advance . . . or terminated when it appears.” The firm, in other
words, should not have put itself in the position where its member
was able to obtain confidential information at the same time it was
recommending purchase of the company’s shares to brokerage
customers. This parallels a case in which a firm solicited customers to
purchase a company’s shares after the firm received adverse
information about the company. The district court held that the firm
could not place itself in a conflict situation and then disregard its
duty to one client:
Shearson voluntarily entered into a fiduciary relationship with
Tidal Marine, as a consequence of which it received confidential
information. Shearson also voluntarily entered into fiduciary
relationships with its customers. It cannot recognize its duty to the
former while ignoring its obligation to the latter. Having assumed
fiduciary responsibilities, Shearson is required to incur whatever
65
commercial disadvantage fulfillment of those obligations entails.

While this approach to resolving conflicts of duty is appealing, it is
not sufficiently robust to address many types of cases. It is often
difficult or impossible to claim that the actor should not have placed
himself in a situation where a conflict might arise. In Arizona v.
66
Macumber, for example, the attorneys for the deceased obtained
confidential information from their client as part of performing their
duty. They could not have known at the time that the same
information would assist in another’s defense, and even if they knew,
they could not disregard their client’s statement.
Another difficulty with this approach is determining at which point
the actor is at fault in not foreseeing a potential conflict. The process
of creating the conditions that lead one to undertake the allegedly
illegal action can entail several events, and the problem lies in
67
determining for which event the actor is culpable. In Black, should
one ask whether the individual firm member should have sat on the

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 94,329 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 1974).
66. 544 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Ariz. 1976).
67. See Robinson, supra note 58, at 9 (illustrating the difficulties in this problem
with an example of an actor who has a defective muffler which throws off a spark and
starts a forest fire).
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issuer’s board, whether the firm should have solicited the purchase of
the company’s shares while he was on its board, whether the firm
should have made representations about the company while he was
on the board, whether the individual himself should have made such
representations, or whether he should have corrected his earlier
representations if he subsequently learned that they were false?
4.

Determining which interest was present first
In many cases, applying the doctrine of actio libera in causa does not
work well because it is difficult to argue that actors are responsible for
causing the conditions of their own defense. Another approach
attempts to determine which of the two competing interests arose
first. The idea here is that when a fiduciary agrees to act on behalf of
a principal, the fiduciary agrees to put the interests of that principal
68
first—“first in time, first in right.” And the principal may not have
entered the relationship if he knew that the fiduciary would have a
conflict with respect to other principals. Thus, resolving conflicts in
this manner is often accomplished by requiring consent by the first
principal before a fiduciary can act on behalf of a second. The
Second Restatement of Agency provides, “Unless otherwise agreed,
an agent is subject to a duty not to act or to agree to act during the
period of his agency for persons whose interests conflict with those of
69
the principal in matters in which the agent is employed.” The same
is true for attorneys. When addressing conflicts of duty between and
among multiple clients, the general rule according to the Third
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers is that conflicts are
70
prohibited unless all affected clients consent.
The “first in time, first in right” rule has been applied to a company
director who is subsequently named a trustee where the trust holds
71
shares of the company. In Rosencrans v. Fry, the court resolved this
conflict by requiring the trustee to continue to satisfy the interests of
the company’s shareholders before satisfying the interests of the
beneficiaries. In that case, a company officer (Fry), became a trustee
72
for a testamentary trust that held the company’s shares. One of the
68. Cf. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85 (1954) (explaining
that for statutory liens, this widely-accepted principle grants satisfaction first to prior
claims) (citing Ranking v. Scott, 25 U.S. 177, 179 (1827)).
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 394 (1958).
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 (2000).
71. 91 A.2d 162 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1952), aff’d, 95 A.2d 905 (N.J. 1953).
72. The case concerned one-half of the estate of Charles Rosencrans,
bequeathed to his wife Lee and to William Fry, in trust for the benefit of Lee and
Rosencrans’s two nephews. Id. at 163-64. This portion of the estate included all of
Rosencrans’s stock in a company that he organized. Id. at 164. Fry managed the
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beneficiaries (Lee Rosencrans, the testator’s wife) claimed that Fry
should have caused the company to declare greater dividends
between the time of the testator’s death and the time that Fry,
73
pursuant to an option provided by the will, purchased the shares.
Fry’s failure to cause the company to declare greater dividends, Lee
74
claimed, constituted a breach of duty as trustee. The court noted,
“It is obvious that the duty as director and the duty as trustee might in
some cases lead in different directions. They must be composed
75
upon some rational basis.” In resolving the case in Fry’s favor, the
court pointed out that Lee and Fry were on the board of directors
76
and had approved dividends and other company policies.
She
objected only after Fry sought to purchase the shares pursuant to his
77
option. The court noted that long before Fry became a trustee, the
company did not distribute all of its earnings to shareholders—it
78
retained earnings for business purposes. The testator, therefore,
must have contemplated that some of the earnings would be retained
for operations and expansion, and both Lee and Fry agreed early on
79
that the company should continue to expand.
The court recognized that in voting shares of stock, trustees
80
typically have a duty to promote the interests of the beneficiaries.
But this doctrine, the court said, “does not embrace a duty to advance
the interest of the beneficiary at the expense of the corporation and
81
other outstanding stockholders’ interests.”
The court, however,

company and sat on the board of directors. Id. at 166. In his will, Rosencrans also
gave Fry the right to purchase the shares in the trust corpus for twenty-five dollars
per share. Id. at 163. Much of the litigation surrounded the right of Fry to purchase
the shares, but the court also addressed Lee’s claim that Fry should have been
required to account to her for earnings of the company that accrued between the
date of Rosencrans’s death and the date Fry exercised his right to purchase. Id. at
165. For a discussion of this case, see Frank T. Becker, Control of Trust-Held
Companies, 19 J. CORP. L. 41, 53-55 (1993) and Note, The Trust Corporation: Dual
Fiduciary Duties and the Conflict of Institutions, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 713, 720-21 (1961).
73. Rosencrans, 91 A.2d at 164.
74. The court recognized the difficult spot in which the trustee found himself.
Id. at 165. The court stated that Fry “was also a director of the company and was
saddled with the duties of that office. It is impossible to evaluate the performance of
his duty as trustee under the will without taking into account the propriety of his
performance as director of the company.” Id. at 165-66. The court expressed that
the difficulty in the case arose not because the trustee placed himself in a conflict
situation, but rather, from a potential conflict “which the testator himself created.”
Id. at 166.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 166-67.
78. Id. at 167.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 168.
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sidestepped the issue of determining which interest should prevail.
The court could have concluded that a trustee’s duty to a beneficiary
prevails over a company director’s duty to shareholders. Ample
authority supports the proposition that the duty of a trustee to the
beneficiaries of a trust is more important than the duty of a company
83
director to the shareholders. Instead of ruling in the beneficiary’s
favor, the court seemed to think that the trustee could act with
“fairness” in discharging his duties to both principals, but it is hard to
understand what fairness means in this context and why the meager
dividends declared during the relevant period were fair to the
beneficiaries.
In addition to the unanswered questions raised in this case,
attempting to determine which interest was present first would not
help resolve many other cases. While it might explain Arizona v.
84
Macumber, where the duty of confidentiality to the deceased client
arose long before the duty to provide a defense to Macumber, it
would not assist in resolving the conflicts that arose in Black v.
85
Shearson, Hammill & Company and Cotton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
86
Fenner & Smith. In those cases, emphasizing the timing of when a
duty arose introduces arbitrariness into the cases that makes
application of the principle unworkable. Some brokerage or advisory
clients may have established their relationship with the financial firm
before it received confidential information and some after. This
would lead to the untenable situation where the firm would resolve
conflicts with clients differently depending on when a particular
relationship arose. Not only would this be difficult to administer, it
would result in similar clients being treated differently based on the
arbitrary distinction of when their relationship with the firm
commenced.
5.

Seeking the view of a neutral third party
A fifth approach employed by courts to resolve conflicts of duty is
to remove the yoke of decision from the parties and place it on a
82. See Becker, supra note 72, at 53 (noting that the court in Rosencrans did not
give specific guidelines for trustee-managers to resolve potential conflicts of interest).
83. See, e.g., Prueter v. Bork, 435 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (asserting
that the duty of loyalty owed to a beneficiary by a trustee is the most important of any
fiduciary relationship); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (1959) (“The
duties of a trustee are more intensive than the duties of some other fiduciaries.”);
SCOTT & FRACHTER, supra note 12, at § 170 (“In some relations the fiduciary element
is more intense than others; it is peculiarly intense in the case of a trust.”).
84. 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976).
85. 72 Cal. Rptr. 157 (Ct. App. 1968).
86. 699 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Okla. 1988).
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neutral third party with the information and distance to decide the
conflict objectively.
Courts adopting this approach display a
paternalistic view that parties faced with a conflict are incapable of
resolving it on their own and should turn instead to the court or
some other third party for guidance. This sentiment is illustrated in
87
In that case, a
Shanley’s Estate v. Fidelity Union Trust Company.
testamentary trust included stock of a subsidiary company, and
certain directors of the subsidiary’s parent were also directors of the
88
trustee company. The parent sought to merge with the subsidiary,
and it offered to purchase the shares of the subsidiary from the
89
trust.
The trust beneficiaries objected to the sale, but several
directors of the trust company, who also were directors of the parent,
90
supported it. The directors who served on both the board of the
trust company and the board of the parent were presented with a
conflict. They owed a duty to the parent to purchase shares of the
subsidiary, held by the trust, on the most favorable terms possible;
they also owed a duty to the heirs to refrain from selling the shares
91
because the heirs opposed the sale. The court stated, “The directors
of our trustee are in conscience bound to consider only the welfare of
our wards and strive for the best price obtainable; as directors of the
[parent], their duty is no less to secure the most favorable terms. The
92
true balance is infinite.” The opinion at least twice suggested the
parties contact the court for advice. The court noted, “In the
dilemma in which it found itself, the course open to our trustee was
to apply to the court for instructions, not to compel our wards to
93
appeal for protection.”
The court did not permit the sale and
concluded that the trustee “may shift the responsibility to the court
94
by asking instructions.”
While seeking outside advice may have provided for certainty in
Shanley’s Estate, applying such an approach across-the-board is
impractical. First, in many cases, a fiduciary faced with a conflict of
duty must make a quick decision—time is a luxury not afforded an
attorney in the heat of trial or a financial adviser faced with dynamic
market conditions. Second, requiring a fiduciary to seek the advice
of a third party each time a conflict arose would be burdensome.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

138 A. 388 (N.J. Ch. 1927).
Id. at 388.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 389.
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While third parties such as ethics committees may establish hot-lines
or other avenues to render informal advice, they likely do not
anticipate being called upon to make decisions each and every time a
conflict arises. Third, even if a third party renders a decision, there is
95
no guarantee a court will agree. Finally, seeking such prospective
relief is generally inconsistent with our system of justice. Where
parties disagree in retrospect, they call upon courts to decide their
case, but courts typically do not make such decisions prospectively. It
is the nature of the judicial process to settle disputes based on events
that occurred in the past and establish general rules as instruments of
social control, not to provide prospective advice to individual
96
parties.
Each of the five approaches identified fails as a consistent means to
address conflicts of duty and account for the outcomes in the cases.
One approach is to weigh competing interests, but that approach is
97
too subjective, and other courts specifically reject it. Some courts
look for a property interest, but that seems to sidestep the analysis
that allows those courts to reach the conclusion that a property
interest exists and merits protection. Still other courts seem to take
the view that a fiduciary should not create a conflict situation and
then seek to avoid blame for taking actions that might otherwise be
viewed as culpable—actors may not cause the conditions of their own
defense. But not all conflicts of duty arise as a result of poor
foresight. Other approaches—first in time, first in right, and relying
on a third party decision-maker—are inadequate. In order to
determine how courts resolve conflicts of duty, I shall explore more
deeply the nature of the duties that the fiduciary owes its principals.
Only after distinguishing between the duties can one make sense of
the courts’ rulings.
II. LOYALTY AND CARE
Part I explored conflicts between duties owed to multiple
principals and outlined various approaches to addressing those
95. See, e.g., Arizona v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084, 1087 (Ariz. 1976) (Holohan, J.,
concurring) (emphasizing that, although the parties in that case had sought and
received an opinion from the Committee on Ethics of the State Bar about a legal
issue, the court ignored the Committee’s advice).
96. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121 (1984) (“If it were not possible to
communicate general standards of conduct, which multitudes of individuals could
understand, without further direction, as requiring from them certain conduct when
occasion arose, nothing that we now recognize as law could exist.”).
97. See, e.g., Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 72 Cal. Rptr. 157, 161 (Ct. App.
1968) (rejecting a balancing test in favor of either avoiding the conflict in advance or
terminating it once it appears).
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conflicts. What makes these cases difficult is that the courts were
faced with competing claims of a different nature—a claim by one
principal not to be harmed by the fiduciary and a claim by another to
be helped, but helping the second in each case entailed harming the
first. This Part demonstrates that these two competing claims reflect
a tension between satisfying the duty of loyalty and promoting the
duty of care, duties that wind around each other like a double helix
98
comprising the fiduciary obligation. To illustrate this tension, this
Part examines the character of the duties. Once the difference
between the two duties is established, Part III shall discuss how courts
apply these principles and enforce the duty of loyalty, even if it results
in a breach of the duty of care.
A. The Duty of Loyalty
An agreement to enter into a fiduciary relationship generates the
99
fiduciary’s duty of loyalty. One may begin, therefore, by considering
what a relationship of loyalty entails. Consider the characteristics of a
relationship that results from a promise to keep a secret. First, the
promise implies negative action on the part of the promisor; the
promisor agrees to refrain from acting against the other’s wishes by
refraining from disclosing a secret. Second, the promise represents
an ongoing commitment; the promisor agrees to keep the secret not
only for the time being but also for an extended, usually open-ended,
period. Third, the promise requires (or may require) a sacrifice; one
promises to keep a secret even at the risk of some hardship and only
98. See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 75 (1991)
(announcing that a fiduciary’s duties consist of both a duty of care and a duty of
loyalty); Cent. States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Trans.,
Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 572 (1985) (stating that ERISA trustee’s fiduciary standards of
loyalty and care are borrowed from common law); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993) (“Duty of care and duty of loyalty are the traditional
hallmarks of a fiduciary who endeavors to act in the service of a corporation and its
stockholders.”); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985)
(categorizing the duty to exercise an informed business judgment as falling under
the duty of care, rather than under the duty of loyalty); see also Langbein, supra note
1, at 655 (proclaiming, “The law of fiduciary administration . . . resolves into two
great principles, the duties of loyalty and prudence.”); E. Norman Veasey, The
Defining Tension in Corporate Governance in America, 52 BUS. LAW. 393, 397 (1997)
(charging directors, as fiduciaries, with the duties of loyalty and care to both the
corporation and its stockholders).
99. The fiduciary’s duty of loyalty is a legal duty. But one often uses the word
“loyalty” to depict non-legal relationships, such as loyalty to one’s school or one’s
colleague. In fact, to preserve relationships of loyalty, legal requirements are often
set aside, such as the requirement to testify against a spouse, a client, or a patient. See
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS 47
(1993) (distinguishing criminality, where the law requires a link between the
outward act and internal intention, and morality, where the importance lies in
“whether the bond of love, friendship, or trust is breached or maintained.”).
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after placing one’s own interests second (one who agrees to keep a
secret only until doing so causes personal hardship is hardly
considered loyal).
Finally, a promise to keep a secret is
unambiguous. While disclosure may be permitted in some cases, the
nature of the undertaking is clear-cut and the relationship is
tarnished or ends from an unauthorized disclosure. Each of these
elements—an ongoing commitment not to act against another’s
interests, maintained at personal sacrifice, and unbending in
nature—characterizes loyalty.
While a duty of loyalty often includes a commitment not to disclose
the secrets of another, it means more in the fiduciary context. It also
includes not making use of the principal’s information or other
resources for one’s own advantage (or the advantage of a third
person) because such use may harm the principal. Thus, the
fiduciary may not take advantage of the principal—an important
100
component of any relationship of loyalty.
1.

The nature of the duty of loyalty
The negative component of the fiduciary duty is captured by the
duty of loyalty. Under the heading, “Duty of Loyalty,” the Second
Restatement of Trusts states that the fiduciary “is under a duty not to
profit at the expense of the beneficiary and not to enter into
competition with him without his consent, unless authorized to do
101
so.” Similarly, the Second Restatement of Agency provides that the
duty of loyalty entails a duty not to make a profit on transactions
102
conducted for the principal or deal with the principal as an adverse
103
party. In his celebrated treatise, John Norton Pomeroy wrote about
the relationship between a trustee and a beneficiary, and divided the
100. See, e.g., Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 677 N.E.2d 159, 182 (Mass.
1997) (explaining that the duty of loyalty requires a corporate officer to disclose
before taking advantage of a corporate opportunity or engaging in self-dealing);
Folkin v. Cole, 548 N.E.2d 795, 808 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (suggesting that a director
breaches his fiduciary duty to the corporation by taking advantage of a business
opportunity belonging to the corporation). One is accustomed to thinking about
loyalty as a relationship among three parties. A is said to be disloyal to B if A shares
B’s secrets with C, who is lurking in the background as a potential competitor to B.
See FLETCHER, supra note 99, at 8 (insisting that three parties always exist in a loyalty
dilemma). But a loyalty matrix can include two people when the self-interest of one
of them puts the relationship in peril. Consider an example where A and B are
supposedly in a loyal relationship and where A learns of a potential opportunity that
could benefit either. A shares the information with B, and B, without telling A,
selfishly seeks the opportunity. While it may be unclear whether B must promote A’s
obtaining the opportunity, loyalty at a minimum requires forbearance by B.
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmt. a (1959).
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 (1958).
103. Id. § 389.
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discussion of the duty of loyalty (which he calls good faith) into four
104
categories—all negative. Leading cases in corporate law distinguish
105
negative from positive duties, and the duty of loyalty often is
106
considered a duty against self-dealing.
A classic treatment of the
corporate director’s duty of loyalty provides, “The basic principle to
be observed is that the director should not use his corporate position
107
to make a personal profit or gain other personal advantage.” The
same is true for lawyers. Under the rubric of duties of loyalty, the
Third Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers recognizes, “In
108
general, they prohibit the lawyer from harming the client.”
The
Revised Uniform Partnership Act states that a partner’s duty of loyalty
is limited to prohibitions against theft, self-dealing, and competing
109
against the partnership.
While the nature of the fiduciary duty of loyalty is clear—a negative
duty not to harm the principal—enforcing the duty is difficult
because the ability to control the affairs or assets of another presents
subtle opportunities for cheating or stealing that are hard to monitor.
Courts, therefore, impose prohibitions or prophylactic rules to
110
ensure that the fiduciary is not tempted to act selfishly.
104. See JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § VI, at
§§ 1075-78 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941) (explaining that the duty of
loyalty includes (1) the duty not to deal with trust property for one’s own advantage;
(2) the duty not to commingle trust funds; (3) the duty not to accept a position,
enter into a relation, or do any act inconsistent with the interests of the beneficiary;
and (4) the duty not to sell trust property to oneself).
105. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Co., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del.
1987) (obligating directors, under the duty of loyalty, with an affirmative duty to
protect corporate interests and also with a duty to avoid conduct injurious to the
corporation); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (requiring more
than the absence of fraud or bad faith in order to fulfill one’s fiduciary duty); Guth v.
Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (describing the duty of officers and directors as
“not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation committed to his
charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that would work injury to the
corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage”).
106. See Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke, 724 A.2d 783, 789 (N.J. 1999) (noting that an
employee’s self-dealing may breach the duty of loyalty owed to the employer).
107. The Corporate Director’s Guidebook, 33 BUS. LAW. 1591, 1599 (1978). See generally
Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22
BUS. LAW. 35, 35-36, 75-76 (1966) (examining the history of legal rules regulating
conflicts of interest and proposing legislative changes to improve their effectiveness).
108. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 cmt. e (2000)
(proscribing the disclosure of sensitive information, lying, obtaining unfair contracts
or gifts, sexual relations, abusing the client’s dependence, and risking the lawyer’s
independent judgment).
109. REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404(b) (1994); see Donald Weidner, The
Revised Uniform Partnership Act Midstream: Major Policy Decisions, 21 U. TOL. L. REV.
825, 857 (1990) (explaining that these duties are purportedly exclusive).
110. See SEC v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80, 92 (1942) (“Abuse of corporate position,
influence, and access to information may raise questions so subtle that the law can
deal with them effectively only by prohibitions not concerned with the fairness of a
particular transaction.”); Frankel, supra note 1, at 1217-18 (elaborating on the high
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Common law antecedents of such prophylactic rules date at least to
111
the leading English case of Keech v. Sandford. In that case, a trustee
112
held a lease for the benefit of an infant. When the lease was about
to expire, the trustee attempted to renew it for the infant but the
113
owner refused, so the trustee leased the property for himself. The
chancery court, concerned with prohibiting a trustee from taking for
himself a benefit belonging to the beneficiary, ruled that the trustee
must hold the lease for the benefit of the infant: “This may seem
hard, that the trustee is the only person of all mankind who might
not have the lease; but it is very proper that [the] rule should be
114
strictly pursued, and not in the least relaxed . . . .”
Under the rule of Keech, the duty of loyalty represents a
115
constraint—a legal disability—to which the fiduciary must adhere.
Early United States courts followed this rule. In 1816, in Davoue v.
116
Fanning, the New York Court of Chancery set aside a sale of real
estate at a public auction by an executor acting as trustee when the
buyer was the executor’s wife. The chancellor said it was a “sound
and settled doctrine” that a trustee may not have an interest in the
117
118
sale of trust assets.
Similarly, in 1846, in Michoud v. Girod, the
Supreme Court overturned a purchase of property by two executors
of a will, sold at public auction, even though the executors paid a fair
price. The executors were prohibited from considering on a case-by-

cost of detecting fiduciaries’ misappropriation and fiduciaries’ temptations to steal);
Langbein, supra note 1, at 640 (providing that the law previously addressed
opportunism on the part of trustees by limiting their power, but this has been
replaced by a new set of rules under the rubric of fiduciary administration).
111. 25 Eng. Rep. 223 (P.C. 1726). For a discussion of this case, see Jones, supra
note 49, at 474. Establishing prophylactic rules to guard against temptation may be
traced to the Old Testament. In Genesis, God commanded that Adam not eat from
the Tree of Knowledge. Genesis 2:17. When Eve repeated the command to the
serpent, she embellished it, instead stating that God had said to Eve, “Ye shall not eat
of it, neither shall ye touch it . . .” Genesis 3:3. In Rashi’s commentary on this
passage, he explains that Eve added to God’s command, which did not forbid
touching the tree but only eating its fruit, “therefore she was led to diminish from it.”
PENTATEUCH AND RASHI’S COMMENTARY 13 (Dr. A.M. Silberman ed., 1946).
112. Keech, 25 Eng. Rep. at 223.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Jones, supra note 49, at 474 (“The courts attempt to prevent any breach of
loyalty by imposing upon a fiduciary the most severe duty of loyalty; he must be
safeguarded from any unhealthy temptation and deterred from the mere
contemplation of profiting from his fiduciary position.”).
116. 2 Johns Ch. 252 (N.Y. Ch. 1816).
117. Id. at 257. The court’s opinion has moral overtones. The court observed that
the doctrine is established “to remove the trustee from temptation” and that the
remedy established “goes deep and touches the very root of evil.” Id. at 261.
118. 45 U.S. 503 (1846).
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case basis whether a transaction with the testator may be permissible;
instead they were barred from transacting altogether:
The disability to purchase is a consequence of that relation
between them which imposes on the one a duty to protect the
interest of the other, from the faithful discharge of which duty his
own personal interest may withdraw him. In this conflict of
interest, the law wisely interposes. It acts not on the possibility,
that, in some cases, the sense of that duty may prevail over the
motives of self-interest, but it provides against the probability in
many cases, and the danger in all cases, that the dictates of selfinterest will exercise a predominant influence, and supersede that
of duty. It therefore prohibits a party from purchasing on his own
account that which his duty or trust requires him to sell on account
of another, and from purchasing on account of another that which
119
he sells on his own account.

More recently, the Supreme Court recognized that the need for
prophylactic rules arises not only from conscious temptations to act
in one’s self-interest, but also by a tendency to act in accordance with
120
unconscious bias.
Even if a transaction between a fiduciary and a principal exhibits a
fair price, the transaction is prohibited. This prohibition is the classic
effect of a prophylactic rule: certain transactions not of the type a
rule was designed to prevent are nevertheless barred. If a transaction
exhibiting a fair price is prohibited, what about a transaction that
results in a benefit to the principal? In that case, the prophylactic
rule would diminish the beneficiary’s well-being. The Supreme Court
121
addressed this situation in Magruder v. Drury.
Real estate brokers
named Arms & Drury transacted with a trust to which the same Drury
119. Id. at 554-55.
120. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 191-92 (1963)
(stating that the protections Congress created for the fiduciary clients of investment
advisers were intended to eliminate or expose unconscious as well as conscious bias).
Recent research suggests that decisions based on unconscious bias are common. We
make unconscious decisions to further our own self-interest even when we know we
should avoid doing so. According to this research, our desires influence the way we
process information, even if we are trying to be objective. See Max H. Bazerman et
al., Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits, HARV. BUS. REV. Nov. 2002, at 97, 98 (noting,
“When we are motivated to reach a particular result, we usually do.”). For example,
well over half of survey respondents typically rate themselves above average in the
areas of ethics, productivity, health, managerial ability, driving ability, and other
skills. Linda Babcock & George Lowenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role
of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 111 (1997). Other research suggests that
mere disclosure by a fiduciary of a conflict of interest may make matters worse.
Disclosure of a conflict may inadvertently give the fiduciary implicit license to harm
the principal more than if the disclosure had not been made, while failing to equip
the principal with the necessary means to take the conflict of interest into account.
Bazerman et al., supra note 120, at 101.
121. 235 U.S. 106 (1914).
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122

acted as trustee.
The transactions were conducted in the regular
course of business, and on terms that cost the estate “not a penny
123
more” than any other firm. The Court noted that the relationship
between the firm and the trustees actually benefited the estate by
enabling the trustees to immediately reinvest trust assets with no loss
124
of income.
Nevertheless, the Court insisted on applying a
prophylactic rule:
It is a well-settled rule that a trustee can make no profit out of his
trust. The rule in such cases springs from his duty to protect the
interests of the estate, and not to permit his personal interest to in
any wise conflict with his duty in that respect. The intention is to
provide against any possible selfish interest exercising an influence
which can interfere with the faithful discharge of the duty which is
125
owing in a fiduciary capacity.

Modern fiduciary law reflects the rule of Michoud and Magruder. It
prohibits transactions between a fiduciary and his principal, even if
the transaction would put the principal in a better position than he
126
would have been in had the transaction not occurred.

122. Id. at 118.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 119.
125. Id.; cf. Ostic v. Mackmiller, 207 P.2d 1008, 1010-11 (N.M. 1949) (recognizing
that transactions between guardians and wards, through which the guardian obtains
a benefit, are presumptively invalid).
126. See, e.g., Marsh v. Gentry, 642 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1982) (refusing to uphold a
transaction between a fiduciary and a principal, even though the principal arguably
would have profited $75,000 from the transaction). In that case, John Marsh and
Tom Gentry formed a partnership to buy and sell horses for profit. Id. at 575. The
partnership owned a mare named Champagne Woman and a foal of Champagne
Woman named Excitable Lady. Id. The partnership consigned Champagne Woman
for sale. Id. Then, without telling Marsh, Gentry, through a third person, bid on
Champagne Woman and purchased her for $135,000. Id. The partnership put
Excitable Lady up for sale and Gentry purchased her through a third person as well.
Id.
The court stated that partners must act with a high degree of good faith and
disallowed the transactions. Id. at 576. The relevant Kentucky statute provided that
a partner must account for and hold as trustee any benefit derived from a transaction
connected with the partnership, if the benefit was derived without the consent of the
other partners. Id. at 575. The court de-emphasized the pecuniary gain that could
have resulted to the partnership and emphasized the secret undisclosed nature of
the transactions. Id. at 576. The court recognized that Marsh obtained the
stipulated purchase price but stated that “a partner has an absolute right to know
when his partner is the purchaser.” Id. Partners scrutinize buy-outs by other
partners, the court stated, differently than ordinary third party sales, and Marsh said
he would not have consented to the sale had he known Gentry was the buyer. Id.
The dissent made plain that the partnership would have been better off as a result
of Gentry’s purchase. Id. at 578. The bidding for Champagne Woman faltered at
$60,000 when Gentry’s agent stepped in and bid $135,000. Id. The dissent stated,
“Marsh was considerably better off financially with Gentry being the purchaser rather
than if the horse had been sold off at $60,000.” Id.
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While most rules designed to ensure that the fiduciary is not
tempted to engage in self-dealing are negative, the common law duty
of loyalty also embodies certain subsidiary obligations that can be
considered positive. Thus, not all fiduciary duties of loyalty are
strictly negative.
Perhaps the most common positive duty designed to promote the
duty of loyalty is a trustee’s obligation to earmark and segregate trust
property. A trustee must hold trust property in his representative
127
capacity, not in his own name. The Second Restatement of Trusts
provides that the trustee has a duty to keep the trust property
separate from personal property and other property not subject to
the trust, and to ensure that the property is designated as trust
128
property. George Taylor Bogert explained that the reason for the
rule is, “If a trustee is permitted to hold the trust res just as he holds
his individual property, he may be subjected to a strong temptation to
take the trust property for himself and allocate to the trust one of his
129
own less advantageous pieces of property.” A simple example arises
when a trustee holds both trust cash and personal cash, and the
personal cash is stolen. Under these circumstances, the trustee may
be tempted to protect the personal cash by claiming that the trust
130
cash was taken. “Men in extremity have been known to reach across
every barrier of trust to take any monies or securities which could be
131
converted to their salvation.”
One could, of course, reformulate the requirements to earmark
and segregate trust assets as a negative duty not to mingle trust funds
with personal funds, and the Restatement’s comments support this
132
view.
But fundamentally, the requirements to earmark and
segregate are positive; they entail particularized actions the fiduciary
must take. A more difficult question is why duties to earmark and
127. See BOGERT, supra note 13, at § 596 (explaining that the trustee’s duty to
earmark requires him to hold trust property and assets in his capacity as trustee and
not without mention of the trust); see also Lawyers Sur. Corp. v. Whitehead, 719 So.
2d 824, 830 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (noting that Alabama imposes absolute liability on
trustees for losses incurred by an investment when title is taken in the trustee’s
personal capacity).
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 179 (1957).
129. BOGERT, supra note 13, at § 596.
130. Id.; see also In re Union Trust Co. of N.Y., 149 N.Y.S. 324, 329 (Sur. Ct. 1914)
(explaining that trustees cannot be trusted to hold trust property in their own name,
as they would be tempted to use such property for their own profit).
131. In re Union Trust Co. of N.Y., 149 N.Y.S. at 329.
132. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 179 cmt. b (1957) (insisting that it is
the duty of a trustee to keep trust funds separate from personal funds); id. § 179 cmt.
c (maintaining that it is the duty of the trustee to refrain from mingling property
held in different trusts); see also In re Union Trust, 149 N.Y.S. at 329 (holding that a
trustee may not mingle trust property with his own property or other trust property).
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segregate are not treated under the duty of care as positive duties,
discussed below, as opposed to the duty of loyalty. Indeed, in some
contexts, such duties have been labeled a part of a fiduciary’s exercise
133
of due care.
While one could place the requirements to earmark
and segregate under the rubric of due care, the rationale for the
duties—avoiding temptation—seems to suggest they fit better under
the duty of loyalty, which is first and foremost a duty against selfdealing and other harmful conduct.
2.

The duty of loyalty as a perfect duty
The application of prophylactic rules demonstrates that the
fiduciary’s duty of loyalty is primarily a negative duty to be followed
without exception and regardless of the benefits that may redound to
the fiduciary or the principal. Its philosophical underpinnings, in
this sense, can be found in the writings of Immanuel Kant. Kant
divided all duties between perfect and imperfect duties, and the duty
of loyalty may be categorized as a perfect duty, “a duty which permits
134
no exception in the interest of inclination.”
Kant’s discussion of perfect duties informs the fiduciary’s duty of
loyalty in two respects discussed above: the negative aspect of the
135
duty, and the clear-cut nature of the rules.
First, perfect duties
generally imply negative actions. Kant addressed the delicate
interplay between acting in self-interest and acting in accordance with
principles that may be universalized. Kant recognized that while one
is capable of acting in accordance with principles that could be
applied to everyone, at times one might respond to subjective
conditions, applicable only to one or a small number of persons, and
136
act in a way that cannot be universalized. Some actions, Kant said,
one cannot think of making universal (let alone actually wanting the
actions to become universal) without presenting an internal
137
138
contradiction. It is these actions that one has a duty not to take.
133. See Custody of Investment Company Assets with a Securities Depository,
Investment Company Act Release No. 25934 (Feb. 13, 2003) (adopting Investment
Company Act rule 17f-4, 17 C.F.R. § 270.17f-4 (2004), governing a custodian’s
holding of mutual fund assets, and eliminating the requirements of earmarking and
segregating, and substituting other requirements, including a requirement that the
fund’s custodian exercise “due care” to obtain and maintain financial assets).
134. IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 421 note
(Lewis White Beck trans., Prentice-Hall 2d ed. 1990) (1785). Page references are to
the Academy Edition’s pagination.
135. See supra Part II.A.1.
136. KANT, supra note 134, at 412-13.
137. See id. at 424 (explaining that an internal contradiction is an irrationality in
that “a certain principle [would be] objectively necessary as a universal law and yet
subjectively [would] not hold universally but . . . [would] admit exceptions”).
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Kant’s example is a person who considers borrowing money and
139
promises to repay the loan knowing that repayment is impossible.
Kant asks if it is possible to universalize a proposition that would allow
such conduct and concludes that such a universal proposition is
140
laughable: the notion of promises to pay would quickly collapse.
The promisor would be relying on a universal principle requiring
repayment, while at the same time, making an exception only for
himself. He relies on the universal principle that one must keep
promises to obtain the trust needed to receive a loan and then acts in
contradiction to that principle.
The second way that Kant’s discussion of perfect duties sheds light
on the fiduciary’s duty of loyalty is that perfect duties, like duties of
loyalty, are unambiguous. Kant wrote that if a law cannot prescribe
the precise way one must act and the extent of the actions, then the
141
law results in an imperfect duty.
He implies, therefore, that a law
prescribing the precise actions that one must take, as well as the
142
manner and extent of such actions, results in a perfect duty.
A
perfect duty, as noted, is one that “permits no exception in the
143
interest of inclination.”
Kant does not insist that perfect duties
permit no exceptions, rather, he asserts that they do not permit
144
The reason for this
exceptions in the interest of inclination.
conclusion is that an exception in the interest of inclination could be
asserted arbitrarily as an afterthought. A prohibition instead may be
subject to limiting conditions that are not exceptions to a
145
prohibition, but rather contained in the law itself.
138. Id. at 425.
139. Id. at 422.
140. Id.
141. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 390 (Mary Gregor trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797) (explaining that such a law leaves a “latitude for
free choice,” in that it does not specify how one is to act or how much one is to do to
fulfill a duty). Page references are to the Academy Edition’s pagination.
142. See MARY GREGOR, LAWS OF FREEDOM 97 (1963) (“When the obligation is
perfect (obligatio perfecta) the law obliges strictly (is stricte obligans): when the
obligation is imperfect the law is not of narrow but only of wide obligation (is late
obligans).”).
143. KANT, supra note 134, at 421 note.
144. Id.
145. A passage in Kant’s Perpetual Peace supports this view. See generally IMMANUEL
KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE, in IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND
OTHER WRITINGS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 347 (Lewis White Beck trans. & ed., Univ. of
Chicago Press 1950) (1788). Kant discussed the difference between a command, a
prohibition, and a permission. Kant criticized the use of a permission as an exception
to a prohibition. Rather, he argued for the concept of a permissive law, stating that
permission should be introduced into a prohibition not as an exception, but as a
limiting condition of the prohibition itself. An exception is added arbitrarily,
whereas a condition is introduced into the formula of the prohibition itself, and
becomes a permissive law. He wrote, “These exceptions are added to the law only as
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Similarly, exceptions to the duty of loyalty generally are contained
in the law itself. The requirement that a fiduciary not transact with
his principal absent consent serves as an example. Consent is not an
exception from the requirement to perform one’s duty that can be
asserted as an afterthought; rather, the notion of consent is
contained in the rule itself so that transacting with one’s principal
after obtaining consent accords with duty and is permitted. This
notion is consistent with the treatment of consent in tort law.
Consent generally bars recovery for interferences with person or
property, not because it is an affirmative defense, but because it
proves that the tort never occurred. Consent is a negative element of
the tort. Prosser and Keeton wrote that it is a “fundamental principle
of the common law that volenti non fit injuria—to one who is willing,
146
no wrong is done.”
Modern formulations of fiduciary duties reflect that consent is a
negative element of a breach. The Second Restatement of Trusts
provides that the trustee is “under a duty not to profit at the expense
of the other and not to enter into competition with him without his
147
consent.”
The Third Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers
says that a lawyer may not represent two clients whose interests may
148
conflict unless the clients consent. The point is not that the duty of
loyalty requires the fiduciary to comply with rigid rules, but rather
that the flexibility the fiduciary enjoys through consent is contained

an afterthought required by our groping around among cases as they arise, and not
by any principle. Otherwise the conditions would have had to be introduced into the
formula of the prohibition, and in this way it would itself have become a permissive
law.” Id. See also GREGOR, supra note 142, at 101 (restating Kant’s preference for
permissive laws over exceptions).
146. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 112 (5th
ed. 1992); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A cmt. a (1977) (asserting that
one does not suffer a legal wrong as the result of an act to which, unaffected by
fraud, mistake or duress, he freely or apparently consents).
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (1957). The ABA’s rule on
confidentiality states, “A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the
representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent . . . .” MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2000). When the ABA amended the Model
Rule recently to permit disclosure to prevent the client from committing certain
crimes or frauds or to address injuries that result, the ABA included a requirement
that client used the lawyer’s services to further the crime or fraud. As a result, the
ABA was able to argue that such use constitutes an abuse of the attorney-client
relationship so that the client “forfeits the protection of this Rule.” This is not the
same as providing for an exception, rather, the rule is no longer relevant because the
client has acted to purge its applicability. See ABA, Task Force on Corporate
Responsibility, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 7. See also Frankel, supra
note 1, at 1232 (recognizing that the lack of an owner’s consent is an element of the
wrong associated with a fiduciary’s misappropriation of entrusted property and
power).
148. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 128 (2000).
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in the rules governing the fiduciary’s conduct and may not be
presented after the fact as a justification for breach.
These two aspects of the duty of loyalty—that the duty is negative
and unambiguous—and the discussion of the duty of loyalty as a
perfect duty, help explain what is meant by the duty of loyalty in the
fiduciary context. They also help to contrast the duty of loyalty with
the duty of care.
B. The Duty of Care
The duty of loyalty to refrain from harming the principal
represents only the first aspect of the fiduciary duty. A fiduciary at
common law also must act with strict obeisance to the duty of care.
Pomeroy articulated the division between the duty of loyalty and the
duty of care with respect to trustees:
The second branch of the trustee’s obligation is to use care and
diligence in the discharge of his functions. This duty is very
comprehensive; it extends through the entire range of his conduct;
it is entirely independent of the question of good faith, for he will
be liable for its failure even when no wrongful intent nor violation
149
of good faith is charged upon him.

149. POMEROY, supra note 104, at § 1066.
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The nature of the duty of care
a.

Positive duties
150

The duty of care is a positive duty.
It arises from control or
discretion that the fiduciary exercises over the principal’s affairs.
Control gives the fiduciary the means to take steps to act for the
principal’s benefit and is necessary to engage in the very conduct that
151
the parties agreed the fiduciary will perform. In fact, one may think
152
of the duty of care in the first instance as a duty to maintain control.
When company directors, for example, support the transfer of
153
corporate control, they are held to a heightened level of care. And
150. One may draw lessons about the two branches of fiduciary duties from
comparative law. German law also distinguishes between negative and positive duties
in this area. Section 266 of the German Criminal Code, entitled Breach of Trust,
covers much of the conduct governed by fiduciary law in common law systems.
Section 266(1) of the code contains two requirements. The first is a prohibition
against abuse of power. The second is a requirement to safeguard property interests of
another. The German text reflects the negative and positive aspects of the duty. The
first is a prohibition against Mißbrauch, meaning abuse, misuse, or improper use.
The second is a requirement of Wahrnehmen, meaning to preserve, safeguard, or
protect. See, e.g., AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES: THE GERMAN PENAL
CODE 159 (Stephen Thaman trans., 2002) (translating § 266 StGB, a portion of the
German penal code).
Section 266 is used to prosecute what Anglo-American lawyers call breach of
fiduciary duty, although Germans refer to it as breach of trust. The prosecution of
Deutsche Bank CEO and Mannesmann board member, Josef Ackerman, for
example, for awarding excessive bonus compensation to Mannesmann executives
allegedly to convince them to refrain from opposing a Mannesmann takeover by
Vodafone, was brought under section 266 and described by Anglo-American sources
as a breach of fiduciary duty case. See Landgericht Düsseldorf, Mitteilung der
Pressestelle, Hauptverfahren im “Mannesmann-Verfahren” eröffnet [Press Release: Trial
begins in the Mannesmann case] (2004), available at http://www.lg-duesseldorf.nrw.de/presse/dokument/04-01.pdf.
151. Many courts recognize that a fiduciary has significant power over the
principal. See, e.g., Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 348
(4th Cir. 1998) (noting that a fiduciary relationship arises when one party
“figuratively holds all the cards—all the financial or technical information, for
example”); United States Nat’l Bank of Portland v. Guiss, 331 P.2d 865, 876 (Or.
1958) (commenting that a fiduciary relationship often gives one party the power and
means “to take undue advantage of, or exercise undue influence over, the other”
(quoting 23 AM. JUR. Fraud and Deceit § 14 (2004)); Pomroy v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare,
750 A.2d 395, 399 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (stating that a fiduciary relationship
clearly arises when one is legally vested with the power to control funds owned by an
incompetent).
152. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 175 (1959) (explaining that the
trustee’s duty of care includes taking reasonable steps to acquire and maintain
control of trust property); POMEROY, supra note 104, at §§ 1068-1069 (defining the
duty of care and diligence as the duty to maintain control over the trust property and
not to delegate authority or surrender control, and further noting that, if a co-trustee
exists, one trustee cannot surrender control of trust property and performance of
trust duties to the co-trustee).
153. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42
(Del. 1993) (holding that a director’s conduct is subject to enhanced scrutiny in two
instances: (1) the approval of a sale of corporate control, and (2) the adoption of
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recently, the surrender of control by board members to one
individual has been blamed in part for failures in corporate
154
governance.
Cases in the area of directors’ liability distinguish between negative
duties under the duty of loyalty and positive duties under the duty of
155
care. The leading case of Smith v. Van Gorkom is illustrative. The
plaintiffs challenged a decision by Trans Union Corporation’s board
156
of directors to approve a merger with another company.
The
Delaware Court of Chancery, after trial, granted judgment for the
157
directors, and the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed. The court
stated that “fulfillment of the fiduciary function requires more than
the mere absence of bad faith or fraud . . . [and imposes] an
affirmative duty to protect those interests and to proceed with a
158
critical eye in assessing information.”
Similarly, in Paramount
159
Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., the Delaware Supreme
Court invalidated a merger agreement between Paramount and
Viacom, which discouraged competing bids. In determining that the
Paramount directors violated their fiduciary duties, the court recited
a list of matters that the directors should have considered, including
whether either offer could have been improved, whether the parties
could actually complete the deal, alternative courses of action, timing
160
constraints, and other available information.
Other cases refer to a duty of directors to inform themselves of all
161
material information reasonably available before making a decision;
an “active duty” to learn about the affairs of a corporation and what

defensive measures in response to a threat to corporate control). The Delaware
Supreme Court noted that these events have a significant impact on stockholders
and that they represent a fundamental (and perhaps irrevocable) change in the
nature of the corporate enterprise. Id. at 47-48; see also Brudney, supra note 2, at 262
(recognizing that efforts by corporate insiders to preserve or alter control
arrangements for their own benefit may diminish the value of the stockholder’s vote
and, as a result, bring into play the insider’s fiduciary role).
154. See, e.g., DENNIS R. BERESFORD ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL
INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF WORLDCOM, INC. 30 (Mar.
31, 2003) (noting that the Board of Directors’ failure in corporate oversight resulted,
in part, from that fact that they had surrendered leadership to CEO Bernard Ebbers
and, in some cases, viewed their roles as diminished), at http://news.findlaw.com
/hdocs/docs/worldcom/bdspcomm60903rpt.pdf (on file with the American
University Law Review).
155. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
156. Id. at 863.
157. Id. at 864.
158. Id. at 872.
159. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
160. Id. at 49.
161. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
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162

could be done to improve them; and, in the case of a contest for
corporate control, a duty to encourage the highest possible price, or
163
canvas the market to determine if higher bids may be elicited. An
allegation that a director has not taken steps to actively monitor some
aspect of the company’s affairs is an allegation of a breach of the duty
164
of care, not the duty of loyalty.
The Corporate Director’s Guidebook states that, in addition to the
duty of loyalty, “the corporate director also assumes a duty to act
carefully in fulfilling the important tasks of monitoring and directing
165
the activities of corporate management.” The Guidebook expresses
the director’s duty of care as a series of positive undertakings, a “duty
of attention” characterized as “a responsibility to participate actively
166
in the oversight of the enterprise’s activities.”
Such participation
includes attending meetings, reviewing adequate information,
167
reviewing documentation, and monitoring delegated activities.
Finally, while the doctrine of the duty of care is largely judge-made
law, when assimilating fiduciary language into statutory text, Congress
168
has distinguished between positive and negative duties as well.
The fiduciary duty for lawyers embodies similar themes about the
nature of the duty of care. The American Bar Association notes, “At
the core of the duty of diligence is a lawyer’s obligation to actually
169
perform the work for which she was hired.”
Under the rubric of
duties of competence and diligence, the Third Restatement of the

162. Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
163. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286-87 (Del. 1989).
164. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch.
1996) (articulating plaintiffs’ complaint as charging defendants with breaching their
duty of care in operating the corporation because they failed to be active monitors of
corporate affairs); see also BERESFORD ET AL., supra note 154, at 31 (attributing
WorldCom’s failures in corporate governance, in part, to the Board of Director’s
detachment from corporate affairs).
165. ABA COMM. ON CORPORATE LAWS, CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK,
reprinted in 33 BUS. LAW. 1591, 1600 (1978).
166. Id., reprinted in 33 BUS. LAW. at 1602.
167. Id.; cf. WILLIAM POWERS ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL
INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. (Feb. 1, 2002)
(finding that the Enron Board of Directors failed in its duty to monitor certain
transactions and to react to warning signs in those transactions), at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport (on file with the American
University Law Review).
168. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 1382, at 37 (1970) (explaining that the application of
section 36(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (2000),
which governs the conduct of mutual fund directors, is not limited to “situations
where an actual intent to violate the law [is] shown or to acts of affirmative
misconduct,” and noting that “nonfeasance of duty or abdication of responsibility”
may constitute a breach of fiduciary duty under the Act); S. REP. NO. 184, at 36
(1969) (containing identical language to H.R. REP. NO. 1382, at 37 (1970)).
169. ABA/BNA LAWYER’S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 31:402 (1997).
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Law Governing Lawyers requires that a lawyer’s knowledge and skills
170
be used to perform the services required by the client’s objectives.
Under Standard of Care, the Restatement provides that such duties
may include “inquiry into the facts, analysis of the law, exercise of
professional judgment, communication with the client, rendering of
171
practical and ethical advice, and drafting of documents.”
The
Supreme Court has contrasted the lawyer’s “duty of loyalty, a duty to
avoid conflicts of interest” with the “overarching duty to advocate the
defendant’s cause and the more particular duties to consult with the
defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant
informed of important developments in the course of the
172
prosecution.”
The same is true for trustees. When the Second
Restatement of Trusts describes the duty to administer a trust, it
173
emphasizes the duty of care.
b.

Open-ended duties

The nature of the fiduciary’s duty of care, unlike the duty of
174
loyalty, is positive, but it is also open-ended and uncertain.
A
frequent bromide is that the fiduciary has a duty of utmost care to
175
treat the principal as if the principal were the fiduciary himself.
170. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52 cmt. c (1998).
171. Id.
172. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
173. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959) (stating that a trustee’s
duty of care is to “exercise such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would
exercise in dealing with his own property”); see also id. at § 176 (explaining that a
trustee must use appropriate care and skill to preserve trust property); id. at § 172
(noting that the trustee is obligated to keep and render clear and accurate
accounts); cf. Otto v. Niles, 106 F.3d 1456, 1462 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that
requiring trustees to keep and render clear and accurate accounts reinforces the
policies behind fiduciary law by ensuring that trustees perform their obligations
faithfully and with care (citing RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 172 (1959)).
174. See Weinrib, supra note 2, at 7 (“The reason that agents, trustees, partners,
and directors are subjected to the fiduciary obligation is that they have a leeway for
the exercise of discretion in dealings with third parties which can affect the legal
position of their principals.”); see also Clark, supra note 1, at 73 (stating that, with
corporate managers, the open-ended nature of legally imposed duties is substantial,
as they are empowered to manage corporate affairs but limited by the duty of care in
exercising those powers). Clark also states that the duty of loyalty is open-ended; but
here he refers to the application of the duty to potentially new fiduciary
relationships, not to the nature of the duty of loyalty. Id. at 219 n.31.
175. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963)
(stating that courts have imposed an affirmative duty on fiduciaries of “utmost good
faith”); Lawton v. Nyman, 327 F.3d 30, 38 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that a fiduciary
relationship imposes upon the fiduciary the duty to act with utmost good faith);
Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (explaining that a
fiduciary must treat his principal with the utmost care, loyalty, and good faith, as the
fiduciary would treat himself); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 64 P.3d 953, 957 (Idaho 2003)
(concluding that corporate directors must act with the utmost good faith in
managing a corporation); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against McKean, 64 P.3d
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The courts, however, do not explain what they mean by utmost care
176
and in some cases seem to be promoting a supererogatory norm.
The word “utmost” suggests the most extreme or outer limit. In most
duty of care cases, however, the most extreme or outer limit cannot
be defined, and therefore, cannot be achieved. In this sense, one
could describe the demands placed on a fiduciary under the rubric of
the duty of care as aspirational. Professors James Henderson and
Richard Pearson wrote an article in the 1970s about the limits of
177
aspirational commands in enforcing federal environmental policies.
The objective of many tasks, they explained, are subject to resource
178
limitations.
“[T]he phrase ‘as best he can’ does not require a
single-minded, ‘drop everything else’ approach to performing the
task. Instead, aspiration requires that, within these limitations, an
179
actor will perform to the best of his ability.”
Fiduciaries frequently carry out their responsibilities under the
yoke of such limitations. Consider the example of a trustee
managing trust assets. A diligent trustee could spend a majority of his
time determining how to invest. Is the trustee obligated to spend
eight hours each day doing so? Why not spend sixteen hours each
day, only taking time to sleep and eat? The same is true for attorneys.
Courts have stated that an attorney has a duty to be a zealous
180
181
advocate and defend a client’s case to the utmost. Many complex
1226, 1233 (Wash. 2003) (recognizing that MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.14
requires an attorney to handle his client’s property with the “utmost care,
transparency, and prudence”).
176. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.)
(concluding that a trustee is held to “something stricter than the morals of the
marketplace” and explaining that “not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor
the most sensitive, is . . . the standard of behavior”); see also Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co.
of Pittsburgh v. Cagle, 68 F.3d 905, 912 (5th Cir. 1995) (acknowledging that the
fiduciary obligation may impose an affirmative duty to disclose facts beyond that
required by contract); McConaghy v. Sequa Corp., 294 F. Supp. 2d 151, 164 (D.R.I.
2003) (agreeing with the plaintiff’s argument that the defendants, as fiduciaries, had
heightened duties of loyalty and care greater than those owed by an ordinary
tortfeasor).
177. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Richard N. Pearson, Implementing Federal
Environmental Policies: The Limits of Aspirational Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1429
(1978).
178. Id. at 1430.
179. Id.
180. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., 271 F.3d 835, 842 (9th Cir.
2001) (acknowledging that an attorney must represent his client zealously and
protect his client’s legal rights); United States v. Cavin, 39 F.3d 1299, 1308 (5th Cir.
1994) (noting that one of the basic tenets of the adversarial legal system is that an
attorney owes his client zealous representation, including the advocacy of those
positions which have an arguable basis despite contrary authority); Sanders v. Ratelle,
21 F.3d 1446 (9th Cir. 1994) (asserting that an attorney must zealously represent his
client and finding that an attorney who refused to listen to key information
regarding his client’s most important defense failed to provide such representation);
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matters, however, could benefit from nearly infinite preparation. It is
a rare case when an attorney would do nothing more to prepare if
given additional time. The press of other work and matters outside
the office, however, generally will not allow most attorneys to spend
182
eight hours each day, let alone sixteen, preparing a single matter.
A leading case propounding the duty of mutual fund trustees states
that whether trustees are “fully informed about all facts” bearing on
certain matters related to the fund is important to determine whether
183
the trustees have breached their fiduciary duties.
But complete
knowledge on any matter is unattainable. Sissela Bok makes a similar
184
point about a promise to tell the whole truth.
The whole truth on
any particular topic, she wrote, is probably unknowable, and if it were
185
knowable, it would require weeks or months of explanation.
Courts recognize that it is simply not possible for a fiduciary to be
aware of every piece of relevant information before making a
decision on behalf of the principal, and a fiduciary cannot guarantee
186
that a correct judgment will be made. In approving a settlement of
187
a derivative action in In re Caremark International Inc., the Delaware
Chancery Court examined the director’s duty to monitor the affairs
of the corporation and stated that the director’s duty to be informed
does not require directors to have detailed knowledge about all
188
aspects of the corporation.
This responsibility would be
“inconsistent with the scale and scope of efficient organization size in
189
190
this technological age.” In Barnes v. Andrews, the court examined
Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Pullman, Comley, Bradley & Reeves, 929 F.2d 103, 106 (2d Cir.
1991) (stating that an attorney has a duty of “robust representation” of his client’s
interests).
181. See Lipsett v. Blanco, 975 F.2d 934, 941 (1st Cir. 1992) (stating that an
attorney has a duty to pursue or defend his client’s case to the utmost and describing
that duty as taking steps to resolve litigation on terms that are most favorable to the
client).
182. Cf. id. (pointing out that pursuing or defending a case to the utmost may
contradict the overarching duty to resolve a legal matter on terms that are most
favorable to the client).
183. Gartenburg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 930 (2d Cir.
1982).
184. SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 4 (1999).
185. Id. Cooter and Freedman made a similar point in economic terms. See
Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic
Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1057-59 (1991) (arguing that
a fiduciary would be acting unreasonably if the marginal cost of her effort exceeded
the resultant marginal benefit to the principal).
186. See infra notes 187, 190.
187. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
188. Id. at 971.
189. Id. Recent research in the cognitive sciences confirms the futility of
requiring senior executives to possess large amounts of data and detailed
information when making business decisions. Kathleen M. Sutcliffe & Klaus Weber,
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whether a director failed in his duty to pay adequate attention to the
affairs of a corporation and should be liable for the collapse of the
enterprise. In his opinion, Learned Hand explained, “The measure
of a director’s duties in this regard is uncertain; the courts contenting
themselves with vague declarations, such as that a director must give
191
reasonable attention to the corporate business.”
Attorney rules of conduct also recognize limitations on the
attorney’s ability to gather, analyze, and act on information. The
Rules of Professional Conduct state that a lawyer should represent a
client zealously, but they add that an attorney is not required to press
192
for every possible advantage that may be available for a client. The
193
Supreme Court, in Strickland v. Washington, stated that no set of
detailed rules regarding an attorney’s conduct can possibly take into
194
account the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel.
Moreover, no two lawyers would represent a client in exactly the same
195
way. Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Strickland stated
that counsel must be afforded “wide latitude” in performing his
196
duties. Likewise, no one expects the decisions of a fiduciary to be
perfect. The Delaware Supreme Court stated its task was not to
decide “whether the directors made a perfect decision” but whether it
197
was within a range of reasonableness.
The High Cost of Accurate Knowledge, HARV. BUS. REV., May 2003, at 74 (questioning the
traditional assumption that additional investments in obtaining information improve
accuracy in decision-making and help companies adapt to a changing environment).
190. 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
191. Id. at 615; see also Henderson, Jr. & Pearson, supra note 177, at 1435-38
(reflecting on the vagueness inherent in aspirational commands).
192. D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 & cmt. 1 (2004). Not only is the lawyer
not required to press for every advantage, a lawyer may lose most of his cases and still
be practicing consistently with his duty of care. Under the adversarial system, most
attorneys cannot win every case, and no one would suggest that a lawyer has
breached his duty because he failed to do so. Malpractice cases recognize that an
attorney “is not a guarantor of the results,” Helmbrecht v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 362 N.W.2d
118, 130 (Wis. 1985), and the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS provides
that the duty of competence, like the duty of diligence, “does not make the lawyer a
guarantor of a successful outcome in the representation.” RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52 cmt. b, at 376 (2004) (citation omitted). In fact, in
performing his fiduciary duty, the lawyer may not only lose a particular case, but he
may generally perform well below average. Otherwise, half of the profession would
regularly be guilty of malpractice. Id.
193. 466 U.S. 668 (1983).
194. Id. at 688-89.
195. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE
LAW ON TRIAL 8 (1988) (discussing Bernhard Goetz’s decision to replace his court
appointed attorney with an attorney who favored a different defense as an example
of how clients may choose among attorneys who display different styles, strengths,
and weaknesses).
196. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 709 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
197. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 931 (Del. 2003).
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This discussion reveals that one must evaluate the duty of care,
unlike the duty of loyalty, by the process the fiduciary undertakes in
performing his functions and not the outcome achieved. The very
word “care” connotes a process. One associates caring with a
condition, state of mind, manner of mental attention, a feeling,
198
How else may one determine
regard, or liking for something.
whether a financial adviser who regularly achieves below average
returns, or an attorney who loses most cases, has performed his duty
of care? It is only through evaluating the steps the fiduciary took
while doing his job, and not whether they resulted in success, that
one may judge whether the fiduciary has breached his duty.
The emphasis on process in duty of care cases is embodied in the
199
business judgment rule in corporate law.
Judges in common law
courts of general jurisdiction cannot possibly second-guess every
decision made by a board of directors, and a court’s function is not to
resolve questions of policy, resources, and judgment for the board.
Thus, while a director’s fiduciary duty entails positive actions to
benefit the corporation and its shareholders, courts presume that,
absent fraud, self-dealing or other instances of bad faith (a breach of
200
the duty of loyalty), a director makes good faith decisions.
It is
198. See THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 893-94 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner
eds., 2d ed. 1989).
199. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch.
1996) (explaining that liability for a breach of duty does not arise because the judge
or jury thought that a director made an incorrect decision, but rather, the court must
determine whether the director’s process in reaching the decision was rational or
made in good faith to advance corporate interests).
200. See generally DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY
DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS (5th ed. 1998) (arguing that the business judgment
rule creates a presumption that directors acted with due care). Illustrations of the
business judgment rule arise in all aspects of American business life. Courts must
defer to directors’ judgment lest they be forced to make decisions on matters
ranging from employment agreements, In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731
A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998), to conflicting claims among security holders, Harbor Fin.
Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879 (Del. Ch. 1999), and to depleting corporate
assets, Rosenfield v. Metals Selling Corp., 643 A.2d 1253 (Conn. 1994).
That courts may not agree with the judgment of directors is evident from case law.
An interesting example is Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. Ct. App. 1968).
Stockholders of the Chicago National League Ball Club, owner of the Chicago Cubs,
brought a derivative action against Philip Wrigley and other directors of the
company for failing to install lights at Wrigley Field and schedule night games. Id. at
777. The plaintiffs argued that since night baseball was first played in 1935, nineteen
of the then twenty major league teams had scheduled night games. Id. If the
directors of the Chicago ball club continued to be obstinate, the Cubs would face
another season of operating losses. Id. They argued that Philip Wrigley, who owned
eighty percent of the company, refused to install lights not because of the
shareholders’ interest but because of his personal view that baseball is a daytime
sport. Id. at 777-78. The court, however, would not ascribe improper motives to
Wrigley. Id. at 780. It searched instead for what may have been an appropriate
rationale for Wrigley’s actions, such as preserving the surrounding neighborhood,
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precisely in the decision-making process that the duty of care arises,
and the courts recognize that “a director’s duty to exercise an
informed business judgment is in the nature of a duty of care, as
201
distinguished from a duty of loyalty.”
Recent attempts to buttress
the duty of care for company directors through administrative
rulemaking highlight the emphasis on process in doing the director’s
202
job.
The duty of care for other fiduciaries is similarly processdeterminative. In deciding whether a conviction must be set aside for
ineffective assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court stated that a “fair
assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be
made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct
the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate
203
the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”
Cases
examining a trustee’s duty of care make the same point. In a New
York case where beneficiaries alleged that a trustee should have been
and then deferred to Wrigley’s judgment, despite that it may have disagreed: “By
these thoughts we do not mean to say that we have decided that the decision of the
directors was a correct one. That is beyond our jurisdiction and ability. We are
merely saying that the decision is one properly before directors.” Id.
201. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985); see In re Caremark
Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d at 967-68 (remarking on the process-oriented
nature of the business judgment rule that is based on a respect for all good faith
board decisions).
202. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Rule 10A-3(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A3(b)(2) (2004) (stating, “The audit committee of each listed issuer, in its capacity as
a committee of the board of directors, must be directly responsible for the
appointment, compensation, retention and oversight of the work of any registered
public accounting firm engaged . . . for the purpose of preparing or issuing an audit
report.”).
In adopting the rules, the SEC stated that it was not establishing specific rules
governing the audit committee, rather, that “specific decisions regarding the
execution of the audit committee’s oversight responsibilities, as well as decisions
regarding the extent of desired involvement by the audit committee, are best left to
the discretion of the audit committee of the individual issuer in assessing the issuer’s
individual circumstances.” Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees,
Securities Act Release No. 8220, 68 Fed. Reg. 18788, 18796 (Apr. 16, 2003).
203. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1983). In this case, the trial
judge, due to aggravating circumstances, sentenced the respondent to death.
Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d 658, 663-64 (Fla. 1978). The respondent alleged he
was denied effective assistance of counsel and outlined specific actions that he
believed his attorney should have taken, such as moving for a continuance to prepare
for sentencing, requesting a psychiatric report, investigating and presenting
character witnesses, seeking a pre-sentence investigation report, presenting
meaningful arguments, and investigating the medical examiner’s reports or crossexamining the experts. Id. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, all
federal and most state courts had adopted the “reasonably effective assistance”
standard in assessing attorney performance, but the Supreme Court had not yet
addressed the proper standard. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 683-84. In doing so, the Court
emphasized process over outcome and said it is “all too easy” for a court to conclude
after the fact that a particular act or omission was unreasonable and, as such, the
Court refused to do so. Id. at 689, 698.
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prescient enough to sell shares of a utility company before the onset
of the Great Depression, the court expressed that the trustee’s
conduct must be viewed from the perspective of the trustee’s actions
at the time the actions occurred:
[T]he trustee’s conduct is not to be judged from the vantage point
of hindsight; instead, it must be considered prospectively—the
flashback method must be employed, unaided or enlightened by
subsequent events. To decide in the tranquil afterwards what the
trustee should have done during the period of irresolution, is not
easy. Yet that is the unenviable task the Court is called upon to
204
perform.

The Second Restatement of Trusts similarly provides, “Whether the
trustee is prudent in the doing of an act depends upon the
circumstances as they reasonably appear to him at the time when he
does the act and not at some subsequent time when his conduct is
205
called in question.”
One may certainly find exceptions where
courts look to the outcome of an action, and not the process followed
with respect to that action, to determine whether a fiduciary
breached the duty of care. Those exceptions, however, typically arise
in special circumstances or as the result of a particular statutory
206
scheme that warrant a departure from the common law rule.

204. In re Pate’s Estate, 84 N.Y.S.2d 853, 858 (Sur. Ct. 1948) (citations omitted).
205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 cmt. b (2004).
206. See, e.g., Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir.
1982). Gartenberg analyzed standards courts should apply when determining whether
fees paid by a mutual fund to an adviser to manage the fund are excessive under
Section 36 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-35(b) (1987).
In that case, mutual fund shareholders brought a derivative action against the fund,
the fund’s investment adviser, and other affiliates of the fund, alleging that the fee
the fund agreed to pay its adviser was so high that it constituted a breach of fiduciary
duty under the Act. Id. at 926-27. The court adopted, at least in part, an outcomeoriented approach, stating that for a violation to occur, the adviser must charge a fee
“so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relation to the services
rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.” Id. at
928. The court also stepped away from the lower court’s ruling, which, in deciding
whether the adviser violated its fiduciary duty, “gave weight to the process” by which
the disinterested trustees of the fund approved the management agreement. Id. at
927. The court of appeals stated that even if the trustees were fully informed of all
facts bearing on the adviser’s fee and performed their duties conscientiously—even if
the process were sound—if the result was a disproportionately large advisory fee, that
alone could give rise to a breach of duty by both the trustees and the investment
adviser. Id. at 930. The appeals court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove
that the fees charged were so excessive or unfair as to amount to a breach of duty
and pointed out that fund investors, while not realizing the highest possible return
on their investment, enjoyed a better-than-average return. Id.
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2.

The duty of care as an imperfect duty
The previous discussion illuminates the nature of the duty of care
as ambiguous and process-oriented. It contrasts with the duty of
loyalty, which requires negative conduct and is generally not
ambiguous. Drawing on Kant, one may call the duty of loyalty a
perfect duty. The fiduciary’s duty of care, by contrast, requires
affirmative conduct to act in the principal’s interest with respect to
the assets or affairs of the principal entrusted to the fiduciary. The
fiduciary relationship, as discussed, arises when the fiduciary agrees
to act for the benefit of the principal. The Third Restatement of
Trusts provides, “Despite the differences in the legal circumstances
and responsibilities of various fiduciaries, one characteristic is
common to all: a person in a fiduciary relationship to another is
under a duty to act for the benefit of the other as to matters within
207
the scope of the relationship.” The fiduciary, therefore, has agreed
to make the interest of the principal his purpose or his end. The
duty to take affirmative steps to further the interests of another is
208
similar to what Kant described as an imperfect duty, and the
fiduciary’s duty of care is one illustration of Kant’s imperfect duty.
Kant’s example of an imperfect duty to others is the duty to
209
contribute to their welfare or assistance.
The duty is positive; it
requires particular acts to be taken for their benefit. Kant asks what
is wrong with simply not injuring others—why does one have to take
210
positive steps to assist them? He answers his question by explaining
211
that it is not possible to desire this way of thinking to be universal.
If it were universal, while society could continue to exist, and perhaps
be better off than a society fraught with cheating and betrayal, it is
not possible to wish for this state of affairs to be universal. Instances
inevitably would arise where we each would desire the assistance of
212
others and we will have robbed ourselves of that opportunity.
207. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (2003); see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 cmt. a (1958) (defining a fiduciary as one who acts
primarily for the benefit of the principal); see also Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary
Principle, 37 CAL. L. REV. 539, 540 (1949) (defining a fiduciary as a person who acts in
the interest of another).
208. KANT, supra note 134, at 430 (characterizing the decision to help others as a
positive action towards harmonization with humanity, as opposed to merely
refraining from harming others, which is negative action).
209. Id.
210. See id. at 423 (“‘What concern of mine is it? Let each one be happy as heaven
wills, or as he can make himself; I will not take anything from him or even envy him;
but to his welfare or to his assistance in time of need I have no desire to
contribute.’”) (citations omitted).
211. Id.
212. Id.
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While perfect duties are generally negative, imperfect duties are
generally positive. When discussing the duty to contribute to the
welfare of others, Kant wrote:
Humanity might indeed exist if no one contributed to the
happiness of others, provided he did not intentionally detract from
it, but this harmony with humanity as an end in itself is only
negative, not positive, if everyone does not also endeavor, as far as
213
he can, to further the purposes of others.

Kant analyzed the open-ended nature of imperfect duties in his
214
Metaphysics of Morals. While one has a duty to promote the welfare
of others, he wrote, “it is impossible to assign specific limits to the
215
extent of this sacrifice.” In determining such limits, decisions have
to be made on a case-by-case basis. The duty to promote the welfare
of others “depends, in large part, on what each person’s true needs
are in view of his sensibilities, and it must be left to each to decide
216
this for himself.”
Kant recognized that the goal of promoting the
happiness of others at the sacrifice of one’s own happiness presents
an internal contradiction. “Hence” he says, “this duty is only a wide
one; the duty has in it a latitude for doing more or less, and no
217
specific limits can be assigned to what should be done.”
An open-ended duty without specific limits describes the fiduciary
duty of care. The doctrine of the duty of care leaves leeway between
the objective of promoting the well-being of the principal and the
actions one must take in furtherance of that objective. One cannot
draw up a checklist of actions to fulfill the duty. Rather, the duty lies
in making the end of the principal the fiduciary’s purpose, and it is
largely left to the fiduciary to make proper judgments and act
accordingly. Mary Gregor has explained that imperfect duties consist
218
in the adoption of ends, not in determinate actions.
They leave
latitude between our aims, or our ends, and in the actions required
for the realization of these aims. It is in this latitude where judgment
219
determines action not specified by law.
Under this analysis, one faces a puzzle with respect to the
implications for fiduciary doctrine. If the actions required to fulfill
imperfect duties are not specified by law, then taking such actions
213. Id. at 430.
214. KANT, supra note 141, at 390-93.
215. Id. at 393.
216. Id.
217. Id. In describing the duty, Kant uses the German word, Spielraum, literally
“playroom,” which perhaps better captures its essence than the English word
“latitude.”
218. GREGOR, supra note 142, at 96.
219. Id.
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220

arguably is not a legal duty.
While imperfect duties generally are
not legal duties, the fiduciary duty of care, of course, is a legal duty.
How can this be? As discussed, law cannot stipulate when one has
fulfilled imperfect duties because they are open-ended. No one can
say with certainty whether the fiduciary must spend four, eight, or
twelve hours a day promoting the ends of the principal. But the
prophylactic rules discussed above, which ensure that the fiduciary
not act against the interests of the principal, also ensure that when
the principal does act, the acts are done, not out of self-interest, but
221
to promote the ends of the principal.
By forcing the fiduciary to
refrain from transacting with the principal, for example, the fiduciary
is forced to refrain from acting out of self-interest. Garden-variety
transactions between the fiduciary and his principal, therefore, are
prohibited. These prophylactic rules ensure that when the fiduciary
acts, he acts to promote the ends of his principal and not his own
222
ends.
The old Supreme Court cases discussed above capture the point.
223
In Michoud v. Girod, the Court held that the prophylactic rule—the
disability to purchase—“imposes” the duty on a fiduciary to protect
224
the interests of the principal. How is it that a negative duty imposes
a duty to protect? The Court’s concern was that the principal’s “own
personal interest may withdraw him” from the faithful discharge of
225
his duty. The prophylactic rule “prohibits a party from purchasing
on his own account that which his duty or trust requires him to sell
on account of another, and from purchasing on account of another
226
that which he sells on his own account.” Thus, when the fiduciary is
required to sell or purchase for the account of the principal, if the
fiduciary cannot transact with the principal for the fiduciary’s own
220. See KANT, supra note 141, at 390 (arguing that the law’s inability to clearly
specify which actions one must take to fulfill imperfect duties creates room for the
exercise of free choice in compliance with those duties).
221. Some have referred to this as the exclusive benefit principle. See Brudney,
supra note 1, at 599 n.9, 603 (explaining that the duty of loyalty requires the fiduciary
to act solely for the beneficiary’s benefit and that the fiduciary may have to forgo
additional benefits, even if they come at no cost to the beneficiary); see also
Flannigan, supra note 2, at 296 (stating that “the strictness of the fiduciary obligation
is calculated to ensure not simply the diversion or non-maintenance of value but to
promote the singular attentiveness of the fiduciary to the interests of the trusting
party.”) (citation omitted).
222. See Brudney, supra note 1, at 624 (contrasting the exclusive benefit rule
governing fiduciary relations to classic contractual arrangements where each party
acts to benefit himself).
223. 45 U.S. 503 (1846).
224. Id. at 555.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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benefit, then the fiduciary must be acting for the benefit of the
227
228
principal. Similarly, in Magruder v. Drury, the Court held that the
rule that a trustee cannot profit from his trust “springs from his duty
229
to protect the interests of the estate.”
The intention, the Court
said, is to remove any self-interest “which can interfere with the
230
faithful discharge” of the fiduciary duty.
The duty of care, therefore, is akin to a legally enforceable
231
imperfect duty. Enforceability, however, is often difficult in duty of
232
It is left to the courts to determine after the fact
care cases.
whether the fiduciary has acted (or failed to act) in breach of the
duty in a given case. Courts typically have applied the doctrine of
negligence to establish when an action (or inaction) of a fiduciary
233
results in breach.
In the well-known formulation of the prudent
man rule, Justice Putnam of the Supreme Judicial Court of
234
Massachusetts in Harvard College v. Amory held that a trustee is
required only to “observe how men of prudence, discretion and
235
intelligence manage their own affairs.” This passage has given rise
227. One may respond that the fiduciary could be acting for the benefit of a third
person—not the principal. But if the fiduciary acts to benefit a third person, the
fiduciary presumably has an interest in benefiting the third person. The third
person’s benefit, therefore, is tantamount to a benefit to the fiduciary, and acting in
the third person’s benefit is therefore prohibited just as acting in self-interest is
prohibited. Moreover, if the fiduciary acts to benefit a third person at the expense of
the principal, such conduct would be harmful conduct toward the principal and
prohibited by the duty of loyalty.
228. 235 U.S. 106 (1914).
229. Id. at 119.
230. Id.
231. Deborah DeMott has noted that judicial opinions in the fiduciary area are
unique in their use of moral language to justify their outcomes. She ascribes this to
the situation specific quality of the obligation as well as the stringency of the
standards for assessing a fiduciary’s behavior and the high value placed on trust.
DeMott, supra note 1, at 891-92. It may also be the case that judges use the
sermonizing language to which DeMott refers because they recognize, at the deepest
levels, that they are requiring the fiduciary by law to perform imperfect duties, which
typically are not specified by law.
232. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch.
1996) (outlining the standards to prove a claim for breaching a duty of care); cf.
Henderson, Jr. & Pearson, supra note 177, at 1434-35 (identifying nonverifiability and
vagueness as problems in enforcing aspirational commands).
233. See Brudney, supra note 1, at 623 n.74 (stating, “Insofar as the fiduciary duty
mandate embodies the duty of care, it may also be an objectionable example of state
intrusion; but it does not impose a heavy obligation because it requires only the
minimum acceptable level of performance rather than the maximum possible
level.”).
234. 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
235. Id. at 461. In this case, a testator left $50,000 to be invested by two trustees
who also were executors of his estate. The executors invested the money in shares of
stock and incurred losses. The appellants argued that the executors should have
loaned the money for interest rather than investing in stock, which is relatively risky.
Id. at 459-60. In his opinion, Justice Putman stated that the executors were to invest
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to countless variations of a reasonableness standard that applies
broadly to fiduciary relations. The Second Restatement of Trusts
provides that the trustee must “exercise such care and skill as a man
of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own
236
property.” One formulation of the standard of care for attorneys is
that they must “exercise the skill and knowledge ordinarily possessed
237
by attorneys under similar circumstances.”
Leading corporate law
cases provide that directors must use “that amount of care which
ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar
238
circumstances.” While courts employ several different standards of
negligence, in each case the individual’s conduct is compared to how
a reasonable person would have acted when faced with the same
239
situation.
This section has shown that the duty of loyalty and the duty of care
differ in character. The duty of loyalty is primarily negative, while the
duty of care is positive. The prohibitions required by the duty of
“according to their best judgment and discretion.” Id. at 465.
236. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (2004); see also POMEROY, supra note
104, at § 1070 (stating, “The principle is well settled that trustees are bound to
exercise care and prudence in the execution of their trust, in the same degree that
men of common prudence ordinarily exercise in their own affairs.”). See generally
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE 227 (1992) (restating in
one volume the rule governing the investment of trust assets and revising related
rules concerning the conduct of a trustee).
237. 2 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 18.2, at 551
(4th ed. 1996) (emphasis removed).
238. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963). But see In
re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-68 n.16 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(stating that the negligence standard is inappropriate for directors because it
encourages risk-averse behavior).
239. Duty of care cases distinguish between acting insufficiently, on the one hand,
and not acting at all, on the other. Courts view the two differently and employ
different standards of negligence depending on which is before them. See, e.g., In re
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 (permitting the business judgment rule defense for board
decision resulting from poor decision-making but not for “unconsidered failure of
the board to act”) (emphasis removed); Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., No.
CIV. A. 7547, 1987 WL 28436, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1987) (contrasting the
standard of liability of gross negligence for directors who undertake their
responsibilities and the standard of ordinary negligence for directors who abdicate
their responsibilities). Similarly, Kant reminded us that one should not mistake the
notion of imperfect duty in one area as a license to shirk responsibility in others.
Rather, the notion of imperfect—or wide—duty is that it may be limited only by
another duty owed to others or to ourselves. Kant wrote, “But a wide duty is not to
be taken as permission to make exceptions to the maxim of actions, but only as
permission to limit one maxim of duty by another (e.g., love of one’s neighbor in
general by love of one’s parents) . . . .” KANT, supra note 141, at 390; see also id. at
translator’s n. 35. Kant distinguished between the failure to fulfill imperfect duties,
on the one hand, and a transgression, or neglect of such duties, on the other. The
former, he wrote, represents only a “deficiency of moral worth,” the latter a “vice.”
Id. at 390. The difference between the failure to fulfill one’s duty of care and
neglecting it entirely is reflected in corporate law cases analyzing directors’ duties of
care.
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loyalty are straightforward. By contrast, the actions required by the
duty of care are open-ended. While the fiduciary’s purpose or end
must be the benefit of the principal, the actions taken to fulfill that
end cannot be prescribed. While this discussion deepens one’s
understanding of fiduciary duties generally, it is critical to understand
how courts resolve difficult cases of conflicts of duty.
III. RESOLVING CONFLICTS OF DUTY
Distinguishing between the nature of the duty of loyalty and the
duty of care accounts for how courts resolve the conflicts discussed in
Part I. Part II demonstrated that the duty of loyalty is generally
negative and the duty of care is positive. The duty of loyalty is
absolute and the duty of care is incremental. Thus, in cases of a
conflict, the duty of loyalty would not permit exceptions to provide
an incremental benefit to be obtained from adhering to the duty of
care. The duty of loyalty prevails over the duty of care as the fiduciary
first must “do no harm.” Any benefit the fiduciary bestows upon the
principal through positive acts is secondary. In the sections that
follow, three areas of fiduciary law will be examined to show that
courts apply these principles in their superintendence of fiduciary
duties to settle conflicts between enforcing the duty of loyalty and the
240
duty of care.
The three areas are (i) attorney-client relationships;
(ii) the responsibilities of financial advisers; and (iii) the duties of
directors and trustees.

240. I shall not address situations where duties of loyalty conflict with one another
or where duties of care conflict with other duties of care. Conflicting duties of loyalty
seldom arise. As negative duties, they generally require inactions or omissions and
rarely give rise to a conflict because the fiduciary should face no difficulty in
performing any number of omissions at once. See JEREMY WALDRON, Rights in Conflict,
in LIBERAL RIGHTS, COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991, at 203, 213-14 (1993) (describing
how many traditional liberal rights, such as free speech or freedom of religion, are
negative rights which should not conflict because they require the constrained not to
act). An attorney, for example, should face no conflict in maintaining the
confidentiality of multiple clients. As long as the attorney remains silent, he has not
breached his duty of loyalty. Similarly, a financial adviser, like all fiduciaries, has a
duty of loyalty to refrain from self-dealing. It should present no conflict for the
fiduciary to omit from doing so.
Conflicting duties of care are ubiquitous and require the fiduciary to allocate
scarce resources among multiple principals. Should an attorney spend her time
preparing one case or another; should a financial advisor place a limited opportunity
investment in the account of one client or another? While conflicting duties of care
raise hard issues with regard to dividing scarce resources, they do not raise true
conflicts where fulfilling the duty to one principal requires breaching the duty to
another. See Henderson, Jr. & Pearson, supra note 177, at 1430 (discussing how
aspiration, or the duty to act, only requires agents to act to the best of their abilities
given the resources available to them and not to cease to act on everything else).
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A. Attorneys and Clients
Attorneys representing multiple clients often face conflicts, such as
determining whether to breach one client’s confidentiality to
promote the defense of a second. As mentioned in Part I, the Third
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers addresses conflicts in
241
multiple representation by requiring consent. But consent in many
cases may be difficult or impossible to obtain. Recall Arizona v.
242
Macumber, where the court, during Macumber’s murder trial, opted
to protect the confidentiality of a deceased client although the
deceased’s own attorneys were prepared to testify that the client had
confessed to the same crimes of which Macumber was accused.
Obtaining consent was not possible; the court had to resolve the
conflict.
1.

Loyalty and care
The analysis in Part II suggests that Macumber presents a classic
dilemma between upholding the duty of loyalty or the duty of care.
The duty of loyalty required the two attorneys representing the
243
deceased to maintain his confidentiality. Every attorney knows that,
absent consent by the client, an attorney generally has a duty to keep
244
In Macumber, the attorneys’ testimony would
his clients’ secrets.
have resulted in a breach of confidentiality—a breach of the duty of
245
loyalty. The duty of care, on the other hand, required Macumber’s
attorney to marshal evidence of his client’s innocence. It is the
attorney’s duty to “present the client’s case in the most favorable
246
possible light.” The amount of evidence the attorney must present
is open-ended, but what better evidence to present than testimony
that another person had confessed to the alleged crimes. The court
resolved the conflict by preserving confidentiality (enforcing the duty
of loyalty), even if it resulted in a less effective defense (inconsistent
with the duty of care).

241. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
242. 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976).
243. See In re Am. Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605, 619 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that the
obligation of confidentiality to a client forms part of the lawyer’s primary duty of
loyalty); Diversified Group, Inc. v. Daugerdas, 139 F. Supp. 2d 445, 456 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (characterizing the duty of loyalty and the duty of confidentiality as
interconnected).
244. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2004) (stating that “[a]
lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless
the client gives informed consent”).
245. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
246. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984).
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The decision in this case is remarkable for several reasons. First,
the client to whom the duty of loyalty was owed was already dead.
While death does not vitiate the attorney-client privilege at common
law, when determining whether to uphold the privilege against
countervailing interests, the fact that the holder of the privilege is
deceased militates against preserving it at significant cost. Second,
the deceased’s attorneys were present in court and willing to waive
247
the privilege on his behalf. While normally the privilege belongs to
the client and is not the attorney’s to waive, here the client was
unavailable. Finally, the countervailing interests were significant
because a potentially innocent person may have been convicted.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the duty of loyalty trumped
248
the duty of care.
In Macumber, the court was presented with two fiduciaries owing
duties to two principals. In most cases, a single fiduciary has multiple
clients and is faced with a conflict between or among them.
Practicing attorneys often are faced with such conflicts after their
representation has commenced. An attorney, at the outset of a case,
may envision no conflict in multiple representation and the clients
may even consent to it. The emergence of a single piece of evidence,
249
however, can lead to unforeseen dilemmas.
Such conflicts often
250
occur in ineffective assistance of counsel cases.
Attorneys during
trial may be forced to utilize or forgo a particular strategy or tactic
that, while assisting one client, harms another. As a result, the nonprevailing party may claim, after the fact, denial of effective assistance
251
of counsel.
In these cases, attorneys during the course of trial
247. Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1086.
248. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
249. This dilemma appeared briefly in the criminal trial of Martha Stewart for
conspiracy to obstruct justice and obstruction of justice. See Superseding Indictment
at ¶¶ 38, 55, United States v. Stewart, S1 03 Cr. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/mstewart/usmspb10504sind.html (last visited
Jan. 31, 2005). In the underlying facts related to the criminal matter, one person
allegedly tipped a second through a third party, but both the tipper and tippee
denied that the tip occurred. The third party reportedly indicated after the start of
the trial that the alleged tip came from someone other than the tipper. Such
evidence, of course, would tend to exonerate the tipper, but it could implicate the
tippee by showing she indeed received a tip, it just came from someone else.
Highlighting the new evidence, therefore, could damage the tippee’s case
significantly. See Constance L. Hays, Setback for Prosecutors in the Martha Stewart Trial,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2004, at C1 (stating, “The document is not likely to help Ms.
Stewart, since it supports the notion that she received information that led to her
stock trade. But it could lend weight to Mr. Bacanovic’s argument that he did
nothing wrong.”).
250. See, e.g., United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1991) (illustrating an
ineffective assistance of counsel motion arising from multiple representation).
251. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 129 cmt. c (2000)
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instinctively treat a breach of the duty of loyalty more seriously than a
breach of the duty of care and tend to uphold the former even if it
means breaching the latter.
This phenomenon became apparent in the criminal case Glasser v.
252
United States.
In Glasser, William Stewart represented two
253
During the proceedings, several
defendants in a bribery trial.
situations arose where Stewart was forced to decide between
upholding the duty of loyalty to one client or the duty of care to the
254
other, but not both.
First, an accountant (Brantman) testified he
acted as a conduit for the payment of a bribe to a defendant
(Kretske), but Brantman said he did not know, and had nothing to
255
do with, the second defendant (Glasser).
The payer of the
purported bribe (Abosketes) testified to the contrary that Brantman
256
and Glasser were affiliated.
Brantman was later recalled to the
stand, but Stewart declined to question him, leaving the impression
that Abosketes was correct and that Brantman was affiliated with
257
Glasser.
Stewart later told the court of his concern that his
questioning would have elicited further damaging evidence against
Kretske, and he believed that it was better to leave well enough
258
alone.
Cross-examination could have cast doubt on Abosketes’s
testimony and was necessary to develop Brantman’s lack of
259
knowledge about Glasser.
The Court noted, “Stewart’s failure to
undertake such a cross-examination luminates the cross-purposes
260
under which he was laboring.” In addition to this incident, Stewart
(noting, “Witnesses who would be favorable to one defendant might be subject to
cross-examination that would be unfavorable to another defendant. In closing
argument, counsel must choose which facts to stress. For example, stressing the
minor role of one defendant might imply the major role of another.”).
252. 315 U.S. 60 (1941).
253. Two defendants, Glasser and Kretske, assistant United States attorneys in
Chicago during the 1930s, were found guilty of conspiracy to defraud the United
States. Id. at 63. The defendants solicited bribes from certain persons charged or
about to be charged with violations of federal internal revenue laws relating to the
sale of liquor. Id. at 64. Shortly before the start of trial, an attorney named William
Scott Stewart entered his appearance for Glasser and the law firm of Harrington &
McDonnell entered its appearance for Kretske. Id. at 68. On the day of trial,
McDonnell informed the court that Kretske did not want McDonnell as his lawyer.
Id. The judge, therefore, asked Stewart, Glasser’s attorney, to represent Kretske as
well. Id. at 68-69. After a discussion among the judge, Stewart, McDonnell, Kretske,
and Glasser, the court appointed Stewart as attorney for Kretske, and Stewart
represented both Glasser and Kretske throughout the trial. Id.
254. Id. at 72-77.
255. Id. at 72.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 73.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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also failed to object to certain statements admissible as to Kretske, but
261
Glasser contended that the statements were
not Glasser.
inadmissible hearsay as to him and that Stewart failed to object on
Glasser’s behalf because the jury may have drawn a negative inference
262
that the testimony was true as to Kretske.
These are both examples of acts that Stewart could have taken in
furtherance of his duty of care to Glasser. Taking these steps,
however, would have harmed Kretske’s defense and Stewart opted to
263
stay silent. The Court recognized that the harm to Glasser was only
incremental and found that “Stewart’s representation of Glasser was
not as effective as it might have been if the appointment had not
264
been made.” The Court confessed it is “difficult” to determine “the
precise degree of prejudice sustained by Glasser as a result of the
265
court’s appointment of Stewart as counsel for Kretske.” The breach
of duty to Glasser, therefore, was in the nature of a breach of the duty
266
of care.
But had Stewart taken the steps discussed, he could have
harmed Kretske. The potential breach of the duty to Kretske,
therefore, was in the nature of the duty of loyalty. Stewart
instinctively opted to preserve the duty of loyalty owed to Kretske,
even though the result was a diminution in the quality of Glasser’s
defense.
2.

Acts and omissions
The strategy and tactics deployed in Glasser also reflect the
sentiment that one generally treats harm from failing to act more
leniently than harm from committing an act. On both occasions, the
attorney Stewart decided that he was better off by staying silent, even
if that meant providing less effective representation for one, than by
267
speaking and causing harm to the other. This strategy is consistent
with the general perception that one ought to leave well enough

261. Id. at 74. Three witnesses testified that they heard Kretske make statements
that Kretske would have to see “Red” or send the money to the “red-head,”
apparently a reference to Glasser, who had red hair.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 73-74.
264. Id. at 76.
265. Id. at 75-76.
266. In the end, the Court held that Glasser was denied effective assistance of
counsel. Id. at 76. The Court recognized that the trial judge put Stewart in an
untenable position and ordered a new trial as to Glasser. Id.
267. See also Flatt v. Super. Ct., 885 P.2d 950, 959 (Cal. 1994) (holding that a
lawyer in a firm has no duty, when severing representation of one client, to advise
him regarding contemplated lawsuit against another client of the firm).
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alone by not taking any action that may make matters worse. The
268
physicians’ Hippocratic Oath begins, “Above all, do no harm.”
Why omissions are treated more leniently than acts, and whether
such distinctions are appropriate or even possible, has been
addressed in the context of criminal and tort law. In 1908, Francis
Bohlen, upon whom William Prosser relied heavily in his classic
treatise, wrote, “There is no distinction more deeply rooted in the
common law and more fundamental than that between misfeasance
and non-feasance, between active misconduct working positive injury
to others and passive in action, a failure to take positive steps to
269
benefit others.”
Bohlen recognized, however, that the difference
between acts and omissions, while obvious in theory, can be difficult
in practice. Bohlen maintained, “There is a borderland in which the
270
act is of a mixed character, partaking of the nature of both.”
He
wrote that the test of whether something is an act or omission is
271
whether the victim is “positively worse off as a result.” In the case of
an omission, the victim is “in reality no worse off at all . . . he is
merely deprived of a protection which . . . would have benefited
272
him.” In his book Bad Acts and Guilty Minds, Leo Katz more recently
described the test as whether the harmful outcome would have
273
occurred the way it did if the defendant did not exist.
Professor Katz provides several reasons why omissions are treated
differently from acts, which are relevant to fiduciary law. First, a rule
prohibiting omissions (requiring acts), as opposed to a rule
274
prohibiting commissions, is difficult to draft.
This difficulty
permeates the doctrine of the duty of care and, as discussed, courts
have expressed that no specific set of rules can establish what the duty
275
of care entails.
Second, punishing omissions may be
counterproductive because it could result in forbearance. As
fiduciary duties become more robust, some argue, fewer individuals
268. Oath of Hippocrates, in HIPPOCRATIC WRITINGS (J. Chadwick & W.N. Mann
trans., 1950), available at http://www.med.umich.edu/irbmed/ethics/hippocratic.hippocratic.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2004).
269. Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U.
PA. L. REV. 217, 219 (1908), quoted in WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 338-39 (1971).
270. Id. at 220, quoted in WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
(1971).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS 143 (1987) (recognizing
limitations with this test and noting that counterfactual assumptions are inherently
ambiguous and potentially contradictory).
274. Id. at 144.
275. See supra Part II.B.1.b.
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will accept their responsibilities.
Third, the consequences of an
omission are more difficult to ascertain than those of an act.
Assessing the consequences of an omission requires speculating as to
what might have transpired had the act occurred; assessing the
consequences of an act requires observing events that actually
occurred.
A deeper reason why omissions are treated differently from acts
focuses on individualism and personal autonomy. Bohlen wrote,
“This distinction is founded on that attitude of extreme individualism
277
so typical of anglo-saxon legal thought.” A failure to act that results
in harm is tantamount to failure to give up or to risk something the
non-actor owns—time, money, safety—whereas acting that results in
harm takes away something owned by the victim. Only the latter case
violates our sense of personal autonomy. Similarly, prohibiting an act
leaves the person free to perform any number of alternative acts—all
acts except the prohibited one—whereas prohibiting an omission
effectively requires the person to perform the single act the omission
278
of which is prohibited. The latter is far more burdensome.
The distinction between acts and omissions helps to explain why
duties of omission trump duties of commission, and why duties of loyalty
trump duties of care. The common law has been more willing to
hold an actor responsible for an act than for a failure to act. As
discussed, holding one responsible for an act which causes harm
addresses a breach of the duty of loyalty. Holding one responsible
for failing to act addresses a breach of the duty of care. To the extent
that that the law treats acts more seriously than omissions, it makes
sense that the law treats a breach of the duty of loyalty more seriously
279
than a breach of the duty of care.
276. See, e.g., Claudia H. Deutsch, The Higher Price of Staying Public, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
23, 2005, at BU5 (reporting that for many companies, burdens of operating
registered public company after passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act outweigh benefits);
Tony Tassel, Europeans Fall Out of Love with Listing in New York, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 3,
2004, at 14 (reporting that Sarbanes-Oxley is causing many foreign companies to
reconsider merits of listing in the U.S.); Richard A. Epstein, Sarbanes Overdose, NAT’L
L.J., Jan. 27, 2003, at A17 (arguing that fewer persons are willing to serve as
corporate directors after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
277. Bohlen, supra note 269, at 220.
278. See KATZ, supra note 273, at 144-45 (noting that removing one’s autonomy
and mandating action seems more offensive than simply prohibiting certain actions).
279. It is interesting to examine cases where courts set aside this rule and permit a
breach of client confidentiality in the face of competing fiduciary duties. For
example, in Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit focused on the common law doctrine known as the
fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege. In that case, shareholders of a
life insurance company brought a securities fraud class action against the company
and certain of its officers, directors, and controlling shareholders. Id. at 1095. In the
course of the lawsuit, the plaintiffs requested information from R. Richard
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The Third Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers confirms
280
The Restatement on its face addresses conflicts of
this approach.
duty in multiple representation by requiring consent. It provides,
“Unless all affected clients consent . . . a lawyer . . . may not . . .
281
represent two or more clients.”
However, a closer look at the
Restatement reveals an important qualifier and betrays the
Restatement’s true concerns. The prohibition in civil and nonlitigated matters, absent consent, applies only when the lawyer’s
representation of one client would “materially and adversely” be
affected by the duties to another client, or when the lawyer would
represent one client against another client, even if in an unrelated
282
matter.
The prohibition, therefore, is limited to situations where
the attorney would take an action adverse to, or harming, a client in
violation of his duty of loyalty. When noting the rationale for the
rules, the Restatement reporters made plain the concern for
“material and adverse consequences for the disadvantaged client”
and the lawyer’s requirement “to remain loyal to clients and protect
283
their confidential information.”
Thus, while on its face the
Schweitzer, who was company counsel during the relevant time (although he later
became the company’s president). Id. at 1096. The company’s subsequent counsel
(at the time of the lawsuit) objected to the requests. Id. The new counsel argued
that communications between Schweitzer and the company, which took place while
Schweitzer was acting as counsel, were privileged. Id. In response, the shareholders
argued that the privilege is not available to the company where the company’s
shareholders are the very persons making the demand, and the lower court agreed.
Id.
The court of appeals recognized that it was faced with competing interests of
confidentiality and disclosure. Id. at 1100. The court opted for disclosure. It
explained that the lawyer’s client here is the company itself and that the company
functions for the benefit of the very same persons seeking the information. Id. at
1101. The court reasoned that management owes ultimate allegiance to the
shareholders and should not be permitted to assert a privilege that would detract
from their receiving information vital to their case. Id.
The court, however, appeared reluctant to hold that the shareholders’ right to
information trumped the attorney’s duty of confidentiality. Instead, the court
suggested that the ability to waive the privilege lay not with the company as an entity
attempting to assert the privilege, but rather, with the collective of the shareholders.
Id. at 1103-04. This suggestion is inconsistent with the view of many courts and
commentators who insist that directors and officers owe duties to the corporation as
an entity as well as to the corporation’s shareholders. See HENRY G. HENN & JOHN R.
ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS §§ 231-232 (3d ed. 1983). The court tried to fit
the attorney-client communication into traditional exceptions to the privilege but
concluded it was unable to do so. Garner, 430 F.2d at 1102-03. Courts continue to
apply the doctrine in a variety of fiduciary relationships. See, e.g., Stenovich v.
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, 756 N.Y.S.2d 367, 376 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (collecting
cases).
280. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 128 (2000).
281. Id.
282. Id. §§ 128, 130. In criminal cases, the rule is stricter due to constitutional
concerns. Id. § 129.
283. Id. §§ 128 cmt. b, 130 cmt. b.
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Restatement’s approach to address conflicts among clients is to
require consent, the Restatement is more concerned with violations
of the duty of loyalty than with breaches of the duty of care.
B. Financial Firms
1.

The duty to disclose
In cases involving conflicts of duty in financial firms, discussed
above, courts hold that confidential information obtained by the firm
284
from one client may not be disclosed to other clients of the firm.
Thus, while customers may argue that a firm has a duty to disclose
material information bearing on their investments even if the
information is confidential, courts, some invoking a property theory,
have ruled that the firms have a duty to protect the information. One
court, Cotton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, concluded that
between the two duties, the duty of confidentiality is undeniably more
285
important.
Cotton can be viewed as a conflict between upholding
the duty of loyalty to the investment banking client by maintaining its
confidentiality, on the one hand, and upholding the duty of care to
investors by disclosing information to assist them in their investment
decisions, on the other. The duty to maintain client confidentiality
trumps the duty to disclose information to assist the firm’s customers.
The court held there was no affirmative duty to speak to the
customers and quoted Basic Inc. v. Levinson for the proposition that
286
silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading.
The firm in
Cotton was not liable for failure to disclose the confidential
information.
Similar cases are resolved differently if the financial firms take
affirmative steps to mislead investors. If Merrill Lynch, for example,
had advised investors to sell their shares when it knew the price would
rise, that advice would have been tantamount to a misleading
statement and a violation of the duty of loyalty. Such affirmatively
misleading communications have been a flashpoint compelling a
different outcome in other cases. Recall Black v. Shearson, Hammill &
287
Company.
Shearson Hammill was touting the stock of a company
while a Shearson partner sat on the company’s board and knew it was

284. Cotton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 699 F. Supp. 251 (N.D.
Okla. 1988).
285. Id. at 256 (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No.
6668, 40 SEC Docket 907, 916 (Nov. 8, 1961)).
286. Id. (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)).
287. 72 Cal. Rptr. 157 (Ct. App. 1968).
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faltering. When asked about the company’s prospects, the partner
suggested it was performing well, and he failed to provide the
289
When Shearson was challenged, it responded
complete picture.
that the partner did not know his statements were false when he
made them, and that in any case he had a fiduciary duty to the issuer
290
not to reveal confidential information.
But the court found
culpability in Black because the individual realized subsequently that
291
his previous statements were false.
He “permitted them to stand
after he learned the truth and before respondents relied on them.
His knowledge and approval of the statements, accompanied by his
knowledge of the truth about [the issuer], were elements in a
292
continuing course of conduct.”
The court ruled the firm had a
duty of disclosure to its investor clients and upheld punitive damages
293
against the individual because he acted with malice.
The SEC has reached similar conclusions in cases with similar facts.
294
In one case, Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., the SEC was required to
determine if a broker-dealer should be sanctioned for making
positive statements about a company when the broker possessed
material negative non-public information about the company as a
295
result of an underwriting relationship.
The broker argued it was
under no duty to disclose negative information to its customers
296
because, among other reasons, the information was confidential.
The SEC disagreed, stating that once the broker released positive
information about the company, it had a duty to disclose negative

288. Id. at 159.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 160.
292. Id. Courts before and after this case have recognized liability where the
defendants have failed to correct prior statements. Such cases typically find liability
under the “duty to correct” doctrine, where the defendants learn after making the
statements that they were false. This doctrine is occasionally confused with a “duty to
update,” which is a duty to revise statements that, while true when made, became
false or misleading over time. For a discussion of these doctrines, see Int’l Bus. Mach.
Corp. Sec. Litig., 163 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 1998), Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114
F.3d 1410, 1430-33 (3d Cir. 1997), and COX ET AL., supra note 19, at 750-52.
293. Black, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
294. Exchange Act Release No. 4699, 33 SEC Docket 311 (Apr. 8, 1952).
295. Van Alstyne acted as both broker and dealer in the shares of Expreso Aereo
Inter-Americano, S.A., and as an underwriter for an offering of the company’s shares.
Id. at 312-13. As a result, Van Alstyne had information indicating that Expreso was
operating at increasing losses. Id. at 313. Nevertheless, Van Alstyne made optimistic
statements to other dealers in Expreso stock about the company’s prospects,
including that “the situation looked ‘very good’ and [that] the company could show
‘black figures’ when one or two planes were put in operation.” Id. at 313-17. Van
Alstyne also made similar statements to private investors. Id. at 332-36.
296. Id. at 334.
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information as well.
The firm should have simply refrained from
making statements regarding the company’s prospects. The SEC
wrote, “Having chosen to continue to effect transactions in [the]
stock, registrant should have refrained from making any statements
which would be rendered misleading by the failure to disclose such
298
Once it “volunteered optimistic
financial information.”
information” about the company’s prospects, “it was bound also to
disclose at least generally the extent and trend of [the company’s]
299
losses.”
2.

Tort law
The reasoning in these cases is consistent with traditional tort
doctrine of the duty to render assistance to others. Under the old
common law rule, one does not have a Good Samaritan duty to
300
voluntarily render aid to others. If one places another in danger, or
exposes him to hardship, however, then one has a duty to keep the
risk from materializing into harm. The owner of a bar, for example,
was liable for expelling an intoxicated customer, who became drunk
on the premises, after the customer died from exposure to the
301
elements. Similarly, a business host was liable to his guest when the
guest took ill and the host refused him permission to spend the night
and placed him, helpless, in his horse-drawn sleigh, from which he
302
fell and was injured.
In his treatise, Prosser wrote that “if the
297. Id. at 321. The Commission stated,
[W]hen registrant disseminated favorable and optimistic information with
respect to Expreso’s condition and prospects, it made itself subject to an
overriding duty of disclosure to its customers. Registrant should have
appreciated that giving to a customer favorable or optimistic information
and withholding unfavorable information which it considered confidential
would be misleading and unfair to the customer.
Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. It was no excuse that the broker-dealer actually believed the company’s
long-term prospects were good. The opinion stated,
[E]ven assuming that it was reasonable for registrant to believe until that
time that Expreso had a bright future, registrant nevertheless owed a duty to
its customers, with whom it was dealing and to whom optimistic statements
were made, to disclose Expreso’s deteriorating financial condition and also,
perhaps, that previous optimistic statements had not materialized.
Id. at 324 (footnote omitted).
300. See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Capier, 72 P. 281, 283 (Kan. 1903) (noting that,
while the “moral law” mandates that one must rescue a person in danger, the “law of
the land” does not require such action); see also WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS 340 (1971) (stating that “the law has persistently refused to
recognize the moral obligation of common decency and common humanity, to come
to the aid of another human being who is in danger, even though the outcome is to
cost him his life”).
301. Weymire v. Wolfe, 3 N.W. 541, 543 (Iowa 1879).
302. Depue v. Flateau, 111 N.W. 1, 2 (Minn. 1907).
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defendant’s own negligence has been responsible for the plaintiff’s
situation, a relation has arisen which imposes a duty to make a
303
reasonable effort to give assistance, and avoid any further harm.”
Traditional tort doctrine demonstrates why Black and Van Alstyne
were decided differently from Cotton. In none of the three cases—
Black, Van Alstyne, or Cotton—could the firm breach its duty of
confidentiality, but in Cotton, the firm was not culpable for failing to
disclose the confidential information to investor clients, whereas in
Black and in Van Alstyne the firms were liable. The key difference is
that in Black and Van Alstyne, the firms took positive acts to place the
customers in peril—they made affirmative misstatements to them—
whereas in Cotton, the firm simply failed to speak; the employees
remained silent and offered no advice on matters about which they
304
had confidential information.
This case demonstrates that, when
upholding a duty of loyalty to one person (preserving
confidentiality), one may not breach a duty of loyalty (affirmative
misstatements) to another. As the Supreme Court has stated, “Lying
305
is inconsistent with the duty of loyalty owed by all fiduciaries.” But
one may uphold one’s duty of loyalty by preserving confidentiality
even if it means not acting in accordance with one’s duty of care by
disclosing relevant information. In that sense, Cotton echoes Arizona
306
v. Macumber regarding the duty of confidentiality to the deceased.
When forced to resolve a conflict, courts uphold the duty of loyalty if
the result is merely a breach of the duty of care.
The result in these cases is consistent with the distinction between
perfect and imperfect duties discussed in Part II. One must always
fulfill a perfect duty even if it results in a breach of an imperfect duty.
But one may not breach a perfect duty and claim that doing so was
307
necessary to fulfill another perfect duty. If questioned on a matter
303. PROSSER, supra note 300, at 342.
304. See Note, Conflicting Duties of Brokerage Firms, 88 HARV. L. REV. 396, 403 (1974)
(noting that Black and van Alstyne imposed liability on the broker without taking into
consideration that he had a duty to his investors).
305. Variety v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996).
306. 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976).
307. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY is consistent with this proposition. A
comment to section 381 provides:
[I]t is normally understood that [an agent] is not to communicate to the
principal any information which he already has, or which he acquired during
the performance of the agency, the disclosure of which to the principal
would be a breach of duty to a third person, as when an attorney, having
acquired confidential information from a client, is subsequently employed by
another client to conduct a transaction in which the information is relevant.
If the attorney cannot perform his duty to the second client without
disclosing such information or using it to the disadvantage of the first, he
should decline to act.
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about which one has confidential information, one must remain
silent. If the truth calls for breaching confidentiality, the only option
is to say nothing at all.
But is this explanation consistent with Tarasoff v. Regents of the
308
University of California?
The court in Tarasoff held that the
confidentiality of the patient-psychotherapist relationship must yield
309
to prevent a threatened danger to another.
Prosenjit Poddar told
his therapist in no uncertain terms that he was going to kill Tatiana
310
The threat presented a clear and specific danger to
Tarasoff.
Tarasoff, so much so that the therapist contacted campus police and
311
decided Poddar should be committed for observation.
The key
point in Tarasoff is the court held that the legislature provided for an
exception, in advance, to the patient-psychotherapist privilege.
Under the circumstances, the privilege simply did not exist. The
court quoted both the relevant statute as well as rules of professional
ethics to show not that the duty of confidentiality was breached and
that the breach was justified, but rather that no duty of confidentiality
312
existed in the first place. Recall it is not the case that perfect duties
permit no exceptions. Rather, they permit no exceptions in the
interest of inclination asserted as an afterthought. A prohibition, like
in Tarasoff, may be subject to limiting conditions contained in the law
313
itself.
3.

Omissions and acts
Another way of looking at these cases is that they turn on the
314
difference between acts and omissions.
The law generally treats
omissions more leniently than acts. In Black and Van Alstyne, the
firms made misleading statements about the prospects of particular
companies, while in Cotton, the firm merely refrained from acting.
Even in Tarasoff, the victim’s parents alleged certain affirmative
conduct in addition to the failure to warn. While Poddar’s therapist
first sent a letter to the police requesting assistance in securing

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 cmt. e (1958).
308. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
309. Id. at 347.
310. Id. at 339.
311. Id. at 341.
312. Id. at 347.
313. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (explaining that conditions are
often formulaic in prohibitions).
314. Generally, the distinction between acts and omissions may not be salient for
fiduciaries, who have a duty to be candid. DeMott, supra note 1, at 906. This
distinction is important, however, when attempting to resolve conflicts of duties
among principals.
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Poddar’s confinement, the director of psychiatry subsequently took
action by asking the police to return the letter and destroy any copies,
315
and by ordering no action be taken to place Poddar in treatment.
The distinction between acts and omissions, however, as Professor
316
Bohlen noted long ago, is often difficult in practice.
In Black, the
individual partner may have believed his statements were true when
he made them. That fact is important because one could argue that
he did not act inappropriately at all, but rather that he was guilty only
of the sin of omission when he failed to revise his earlier statement
once he realized that it was untrue. Under that reasoning, he is no
longer guilty of an act but rather an omission. The act-omission
distinction raises similar questions in Van Alstyne. In that matter, the
SEC’s view was not that the firm had repeated a false statement, but
rather that the firm provided certain favorable information about the
company while withholding unfavorable information. Looked at in
this way, the firm was guilty of an omission, not an act.
So is it possible to characterize these omitted statements as acts?
Courts have held that, while one does not have a generalized duty to
disclose all material information, once a person has revealed some
relevant information, further silence or failure to disclose a relevant
317
material fact is prohibited.
The federal securities laws prohibit a
material omission as well as a misstatement, but only if the omitted
318
act is necessary to make a previous statement not misleading.
A
duty to disclose—to “speak the full truth”—arises only after the
319
speaker undertakes to act. As mentioned, “Silence, absent a duty to
320
disclose, is not misleading.” In state corporate law, an obligation to
disclose all material facts arises once a director voluntarily undertakes

315. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 341.
316. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
317. See generally First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1317 (5th Cir.
1977) (noting that a duty to disclose the whole truth begins when a fiduciary chooses
to reveal relevant information); Grossman v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 589 F. Supp. 395,
409 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (stating, if a company “chooses to reveal relevant, material
information even though it had no duty to do so, it must disclose the whole truth.”).
318. See, e.g., Securities Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2000) (prohibiting
obtaining money or property “by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or
any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made . . . not misleading”). Similarly, under Rule 10b-5, it is unlawful “to make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading.” Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2002). See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences
by Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L. REV. 87, 94 (1999) (arguing that prohibiting halftruths, like prohibiting outright fraud, is efficient).
319. First Va. Bankshares, 559 F.2d at 1317.
320. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1987).
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to make disclosures.
Similarly, in tort law, taking a gratuitous
affirmative act to assist a person in need may create a new duty to
provide the assistance needed in the first place. According to the
Second Restatement of Torts, if a bystander initiates a rescue attempt,
the bystander cannot leave the victim in a worse position than when
322
Thus, providing incomplete disclosure
the rescuer took charge.
may be viewed as an act, putting the recipient of the information in a
323
worse position than if the partial disclosure had never been made.
Tarasoff is analogous. While Tarasoff is considered a failure to warn
case, the acts taken by the director of psychiatry—the order to destroy
the therapist’s letter and the order to take no action to place Poddar
in a treatment facility—may well have placed Tatiana in even more
peril than she was in before those acts occurred.
4.

Information barriers
A final point regarding financial firms is that they now often are
required to structure themselves, through the use of barriers to the
flow of information—sometimes referred to as “Chinese Walls”—to
ensure they do not breach the duty of loyalty, even if the structure
324
results in a diminution of the duty of care.
To address concerns
321. See, e.g., Ciro, Inc. v. Gold, 816 F. Supp. 253, 266 (D. Del. 1993) (“[O]nce
directors voluntarily undertake to make certain disclosures to the stockholders, they
are obligated, under the so-called duty of complete candor, to disclose all material
facts.”); Kahn v. Roberts, Civ.A.No. 12,324, 1994 WL 70118, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28,
1994) (asserting that the duty of full disclosure attaches to directors once they
voluntarily decide to disclose information relevant to a corporate transaction), aff’d,
679 A.2d 460 (Del. 1996).
322. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 (1965); see also PROSSER, supra note
300, at 343 (“If there is no duty to come to the assistance of a person in difficulty or
peril, there is at least a duty to avoid any affirmative acts which make his situation
worse.”).
323. The case law deciding conflicts of duty supports that an omission can be
considered an act when a recommendation to purchase is made while in possession
of non-public information not disclosed. See Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir.
1969) (noting that when a recommendation is made, the salesman implies that he
has conducted research into essential information relating to the security). The
court continued, “Where the salesman lacks essential information about a security,
he should disclose this as well as the risks which arise from his lack of information."
Id. See also Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 94,329
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 1974). The SEC agreed with the Court’s ruling in Slade. See Brief
for SEC as amicus curiae, Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., No. 74-1537 (2d Cir.,
appeal allowed April 19, 1974) (“Rule 10b-5 prohibits a recommendation contrary to
facts about the security in question known by the broker-dealer”); Lawrence A.
Hammermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Disclosure
Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 1167-68 (1996) (discussing the difference between the
affirmative duty of disclosure and the avoidance of material misstatements or
omissions).
324. See Christopher M. Gormam, Note, Are Chinese Walls the Best Solution to the
Problems of Insider Trading and Conflicts of Interest in Broker-Deals?, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 475, 486-87 (2004) (stating that the SEC believes that Chinese Walls are both
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about disclosure of confidential information, financial firms
developed compliance mechanisms to prevent the flow of non-public
information from one part of the firm to another. Thus, while
preserving the confidentiality of certain clients, the firms may fail,
inconsistent with the duty of care, to provide important information
to others. The SEC encouraged the use of such procedures as early
325
as 1968 in a settled administrative proceeding with Merrill Lynch.
The use of these procedures was formalized in 1980 when the SEC
adopted a rule to address insider trading in the context of tender
326
offers.
In adopting the rule, the SEC recognized that, while
protecting confidentiality, the procedures might result in an
incremental decrease in the benefits to certain customers:
These present practices include the use of so-called ‘Chinese Walls’
which are used to isolate the nonpublic flow of information from
one department to the rest of the institution. Depending on the
circumstances, it may be appropriate to advise customers of its use
of the Chinese Wall, because the institution would not be using all
information that it had received to the benefit of a particular
327
customer.

A new insider trading rule, Rule 10b5-1, parrots the language of
the tender offer rule. The rule addresses when a purchase or sale is
considered “on the basis of” material non-public information for
insider trading purposes. The rule provides that a firm may
demonstrate that a purchase or sale was not “on the basis of” inside
information if, among other things, the firm has such information
328
barriers in place. In April 2003, these procedures were included as
important and necessary in financial firms).
325. In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1967-1969 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77,629 (Nov. 25, 1968). In that matter, the SEC
staff alleged that insider trading principles prohibited the disclosure of non-public
information to favored customers who may sell their shares before the information is
publicly disclosed. Id. The Commission stated that in determining to settle the
proceedings, it considered the firm’s undertaking to implement procedures to
prohibit disclosure of material information obtained from a client but not yet
disclosed to the public. Id. at 83,350.
326. The tender offer rule generally requires any person to disclose-or-abstain if in
possession of material non-public information regarding a tender offer, and if the
information was obtained from the person making the offer, the company whose
securities are to be sold, or anyone acting on their behalf. Transactions in Securities
on the Basis of Material, Nonpublic Information in the Context of Tender Offers, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1980). But the SEC provided an exception from the discloseor-abstain rule if the person making the investment decision did not actually know of
the non-public information and if the firm implemented procedures to prevent the
person from knowing the information. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(b).
327. Tender Offers, Securities Act Release No. 6239, 45 Fed. Reg. 60410, 60415
(Sept. 12, 1980).
328. Exchange Act Rule 10b5-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2004); see also Selective
Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881 (Aug. 15, 2000)
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part of a global settlement of enforcement actions against ten large
firms alleging that investment banking departments exercised
improper influence over research departments to curry favor with
329
certain clients and generate investment banking business.
Thus,
the decision to resolve the conflict between preserving
confidentiality, consistent with the duty of loyalty, and promoting
disclosure, consistent with the duty of care, has been resolved in favor
of the duty of loyalty through compliance procedures sanctioned by
the courts and the SEC.
C. Trustees and Directors
1.

ERISA trustees
The principles applied to resolve conflicts of duty in financial firms
apply equally to trustees who also serve as company officers and
directors. A good example is section 408(c)(3) of ERISA, which
allows an “officer, employee, agent, or other representative” of a
company employer also to serve as a trustee for the company’s
330
pension or employee benefit plan.
ERISA provides that plan
fiduciaries must discharge their duty “solely in the interests of the
331
participants and beneficiaries.”
When the same plan fiduciary,
however, also serves as an officer or director, and therefore as a
fiduciary to the company shareholders (and the company itself),
332
conflicts inevitably arise.
(adopting Rule 10b5-1 and stating that, “we derived this provision from the defense
against liability codified in Exchange Act Rule 14e-3, regarding insider trading in a
tender offer situation.”).
329. The settlements contain undertakings stating, “Research and Investment
Banking will be physically separated. Such physical separation will be reasonably
designed to prevent the intentional and unintentional flow of information between
Research and Investment Banking.” See, e.g., Final Judgment as to Defendant Bear
Stearns & Co. Inc., Addendum A, Undertaking I.4, SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc.,
No. 03 Civ. 2937 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/litreleases/finaljudgadda.pdf.
The settlements were subsequently
approved. See SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., No. 03 Civ. 2937 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 31, 2003) (order approving consent judgments), available at http://www.sec.gov
/litigation/litreleases/judge18111.pdf; see also In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative &
ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 640 n.77 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (explaining that
financial institutions are required to erect a “Chinese Wall” between its research
department and its divisions providing commercial banking, underwriting, or other
services to issuers of securities to prevent information from the latter influencing the
former).
330. ERISA § 408(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (2004).
331. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
332. See Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction:
The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1126-28 (1988) (stating that
ERISA’s use of nonneutral fiduciaries creates an obvious tension with the duty of
loyalty that is preserved in the exclusive benefit and prohibited transaction rules).
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This issue was litigated after the fall of Enron Corporation.
Employees who participated in three employee pension benefit plans,
governed by ERISA, alleged that committees, trustees, and individuals
administering the plans, many of whom were individual officers and
334
directors of Enron, breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA.
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants breached their duty of
loyalty to the plan participants by misleading them about Enron’s
financial condition while inducing them to hold and purchase Enron
335
stock.
The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants had a
fiduciary duty to disclose Enron’s financial condition to the plan
336
participants and beneficiaries.
Certain defendants, who served in the dual capacity of plan
administrator and company director, argued they faced a conflict.
The defendants urged that if they disclosed to the plan participants
non-public information about financial improprieties at the
337
company, they would violate federal insider trading laws.
As the
court explained, Rule 10b-5 requires a corporate insider because he
owes a fiduciary duty to shareholders to either disclose material non338
public information or abstain from trading.
Moreover, if a plan
fiduciary were to tell plan participants about Enron’s true financial
condition so that they could sell at a high price before the
information became public, the plan fiduciary could be considered to
have illegally “tipped” the plan participants, which violates insider
339
The directors, in essence, argued they should not be
trading law.
forced to violate the duty of loyalty owed to the company, by
breaching its confidentiality, to further the duty of care owed to the
plan participants by encouraging them to sell at a high price.
Judge Harmon remarked, “The fiduciary’s duty to disclose is an
340
area of developing and controversial law.”
In her ruling, she
emphasized that the plaintiffs were suffering ongoing harm as a
result of illegal activity at Enron, and the failure to disclose
information about accounting irregularities and financial
improprieties “would only serve to make the harm more

333. In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.
Tex. 2003).
334. Id. at 530.
335. Id. at 555.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 563.
338. Id. at 564 (discussing the Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1951), and citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-29 (1980)).
339. Id.
340. Id. at 555.
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widespread.”
This was not a case where silence would simply
preserve the status quo. The company had gone too far down a path
of financial chicanery for the directors to argue they could remain
silent and still do no harm. The court explained that “continued
silence and deceit would only encourage the alleged fraud and
342
increase the extent of injury.”
In ruling that the plaintiffs could survive a motion to dismiss, the
court emphasized the defendants’ acts and not their omissions. The
plaintiffs stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty “based on
Defendants’ alleged inducement of the plan participants to direct the
343
trustee to invest in Enron stock.”
The failure to disclose material
information about accounting malfeasance was coupled with insiders
selling their own shares, “while contemporaneously and repeatedly
exhorting plan participants and beneficiaries at meetings and by e344
mail to buy more.”
Thus, the Enron case is a further illustration
that, while one must act in accordance with the duty of loyalty even if
it results in a diminution in care, one may not uphold the duty of
loyalty to one principal if the result is a breach of the duty of loyalty
to another. As the court noted, one may not “both breach his duty
under ERISA and, in violation of the securities laws, become part of
the alleged fraudulent scheme to conceal Enron’s financial condition
to the continuing detriment of current and prospective Enron
345
shareholders.”
While the defendants tried to argue that they
sought to uphold their duty of loyalty owed to Enron, even if that
resulted in a breach of the duty of care to the plan participants, the
court determined that the breach of duty to the plan participants was
in the nature of the duty of loyalty and would not be allowed.
The conflict of duty faced by pension trustees who also serve as
officers and directors is often crystallized during an attempted
takeover. In that context, plan assets may be a tool to help
management stave off an unwanted bidder, although using plan
assets in this way may harm the plan participants. A leading case
analyzing the conflict raised by these dual roles is Donovan v.
346
Bierwith. In the fall of 1981, LTV Corporation made a tender offer
for seventy percent of the outstanding stock and convertible
347
At the time, the Grumman
securities of Grumman Corporation.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

Id. at 565.
Id.
Id. at 656.
Id. at 657.
Id. at 565.
680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1982).
Id. at 264.
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corporate pension plan owned 525,000 shares of Grumman stock.
Grumman officers, including John Bierwith, the chairman, and
349
Robert Freese, the chief financial officer, were trustees for the plan.
As part of their strategy to avoid a takeover, the plan trustees voted
not to tender the plan’s 525,000 shares at $45, and considered the
merits of purchasing additional shares, on behalf of the plan, which
350
were trading in the $30s. One benefit of the purchase would have
been to make it more difficult for LTV to gain control. The trustees
decided to purchase Grumman stock up to the maximum of ten
percent of the value of the plan allowed by ERISA and obtained the
351
shares for between $36 and $39.
Shortly after the purchase, a
district court enjoined the offer and the price of stock fell to between
352
$28 and $30.
Judge Friendly’s decision makes plain the classic dilemma these
individuals faced between upholding the duty of care to the
corporation or the duty of loyalty to the plan beneficiaries.
According to the court, the officers “were caught in a difficult and
unusual situation” and were “honestly convinced” they were doing
353
the right thing.
The officers argued that despite their duty to act
solely and exclusively in the interest of the plan participants, they “do
not violate their duties by following a course of action with respect to
354
the plan which benefits the corporation as well as the beneficiaries.”
Judge Friendly recognized, however, that from the plan participants’
perspective, purchasing additional shares “was almost certainly a ‘no355
win’ situation.” If the tender offer succeeded, the plan would be a
minority stockholder in an LTV-controlled Grumman, and if the
tender offer failed, the price of Grumman shares would likely sink to
356
their pre-offer level, as the trustees were aware. As the court put it,
“Mid-October 1981 was thus the worse possible time for the Plan to
357
buy Grumman stock as an investment.”
The difference between the duty of loyalty and the duty of care—
between acts and omissions—accounts for Judge Friendly’s ruling.
While the officers were trying to benefit the company as a whole,
consistent with their duty of care, they could not do so through
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 269.
Id.
Id. at 276.
Id. at 271.
Id. at 275.
Id.
Id.
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actions that affirmatively harmed the plan participants in violation of
the duty of loyalty. The officers, at least with respect to the plan,
should have simply refrained from acting. The court noted,
358
“Investment considerations dictated a policy of waiting.” By taking
actions to harm the plan participants, even if well-intentioned, the
officers violated their duty of loyalty and failed to measure up to the
standards required under ERISA.
2.

Common law trustees
The cases regarding common law trustees discussed in Part I of the
Article can now be understood as upholding the duty of loyalty over
359
the duty of care. Recall Rosencrans v. Fry. In that case, Fry served in
two capacities that led to a conflict of duty. He served on a
company’s board, owing duties to the company and the shareholders,
and he served as trustee for a trust that invested in the same
360
company, owing a duty to the trust beneficiaries. Serving in these
roles does not necessarily lead to a conflict, but in this case, the
testator’s wife, Lee, asserted that Fry breached his fiduciary duty to
the beneficiaries by failing to cause the company to declare a larger
361
dividend during the period after the testator’s death.
Fry opted
362
instead to reinvest the earnings in the company’s operations.
The conflict over whether to declare the enhanced dividend is
another example of the classic conflict between upholding the duty
of loyalty or the duty of care—between refraining from taking an
action that would harm one principal, although the action would
assist, incrementally, a second principal. Declaring the dividend
would have provided the beneficiaries with an incremental benefit,
and Fry was arguably required to do so consistent with the duty of
care. Declaring the dividend, however, would have harmed the
company in breach of the duty of loyalty by depleting assets that
could be used for business purposes.
When the court decided the case, it framed the issue as a conflict
between promoting the interests of the beneficiary, on the one hand,
and harming the corporation, on the other. The court stated that
Fry’s duty “does not embrace a duty to advance the interest of the
beneficiary at the expense of the corporation and other outstanding
363
stockholders’ interests.”
The harm to the company from a
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

Id.
91 A.2d 162 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1952).
Id. at 163.
Id. at 164-65.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 168.
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declaration of dividends (acting “at the expense of the corporation”)
would have amounted to a breach of the duty of loyalty. The
incremental benefit to the beneficiaries (acting “to advance the
interest of the beneficiary”) would only further the duty of care.
The court could have ruled in favor of Lee had it considered this
case a dilemma between upholding the rights of a trust beneficiary
versus the rights of company shareholders. Alternatively, the court
could have viewed the director’s duty to the company to not declare a
greater dividend as part of the duty of care, that is, to advance the
interests of the company by enhancing the residual value of the firm.
But the court’s analysis was more nuanced. It recognized the case as
a conflict between harm to one principal only to promote,
incrementally, the benefits to a second, and it would not permit the
harm to occur. Fry was better off not acting at all than acting to harm
the company.
Accordingly, one also may also view this case as turning on the
difference between acts and omissions. The gist of the opinion is that
Fry merely omitted to act to Lee’s benefit; he simply did not cause the
company to declare the dividend she sought. He was better off not
acting, which, while not furthering Lee’s interests, at least did no
364
harm. But the line between acts and omissions is not always clear.
Viewing the case as hinging on the difference between acts and
omissions ignores the fact that Fry acted when he declared a
dividend, but the dividend was simply too meager for Lee. One
could view Fry’s conduct, therefore, not as an omission, but as an act
injurious to Lee. In that sense, the nature of the breach could be
recharacterized as a breach of the duty of loyalty to Lee and not a
365
breach of the duty of care.
But this argument is ultimately unpersuasive. Lee’s claim is most
simply unmasked as a claim for a larger dividend, not a claim that Fry
took an affirmative act to her detriment. After all, some benefit is
better than no benefit at all; a small dividend is better than none.
This case likely would have been decided differently if the trustee had
taken steps to affirmatively harm the beneficiaries. The plaintiff
alleged only that the trustee failed to declare larger dividends to assist
366
the beneficiaries, not that he took positive steps to harm them.
364. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
365. Leo Katz’s test for what is an act as opposed to an omission—whether the
harmful outcome would have occurred the way it did if the defendant did not exist—
is not helpful here because one has no way of knowing the amount of dividend the
company would have declared, if any, if Fry did not exist. See supra note 273 and
accompanying text.
366. This outcome is also supported by the result in Siskind v. Sperry Ret. Program,
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In Shanley’s Estate v. Fidelity Union Trust, also discussed in Part I, an
individual in a similar role took steps that harmed the beneficiaries of
a trust, while promoting the interests of a company on which he
368
served as a director. In that case, a trust company was a fiduciary to
369
an estate that held shares of a subsidiary company. Certain board
members of the trust company also sat on the board of the
subsidiary’s parent company while the parent sought to acquire
370
shares held by the trust.
The beneficiaries, however, made plain
their wishes not to sell, and the court ruled that, when faced with a
conflict, the trustee should not have acted against the wishes of the
371
beneficiaries. As the court put it, “their wish should be our trustee’s
372
command.” Thus, while one could view Shanley’s Estate as a conflict
between a seller whose interest is to sell dear and a buyer whose
interest is to buy cheap, it is more plainly viewed as a conflict between
the duty of care to purchase shares on the parent company’s behalf at
the best price, and the duty of loyalty to refrain from acting against
the wishes of the beneficiaries. The court, while stating that the
trustees should have contacted the court for instructions, would not
373
permit the trustees to violate the principals’ wishes.
47 F.3d 498, 500 (2d Cir. 1995), discussed above, where individuals had dual roles as
both company officers, owing a duty to the company, and trustees of a retirement
plan, owing duties to the plan participants. Certain employees were excluded from
an early retirement incentive program and sued. Id. at 501. The court was forced to
decide whether the fiduciaries should have upheld their duty to the company, which
sought to exclude the employees from the particular plan, or their duty to the
employees, who sought to participate in the plan. Id. at 504, 507. In deciding the
case in favor of the company and not the employees, the court of appeals focused on
the lack of harm to the employees. They were denied only increased benefits
provided to other employees whose jobs were at greater risk of elimination and
otherwise “suffered no reduction in the non-Program benefits to which they were
entitled.” Id. at 507. The court found no harm to the employees, only that they
received fewer benefits than they would have received had they participated in the
plan. Id. The difference between harm, on the one hand, and simply diminished
benefits, on the other, is consistent with the difference between a violation of the
duty of loyalty and the duty of care. The court found no harm to the employees,
only fewer benefits, and it ruled in favor of the company, not the employees. Id.
Explaining this case as a decision whether to uphold the duty of loyalty or the duty of
care provides a sounder basis for the result than relying on the lack of a property
interest suggested in the opinion. Id.
367. 138 A. 388 (N.J. Ch. 1927).
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 389.
372. Id.
373. Shanley’s Estate also can be viewed as presenting a dilemma between a duty of
loyalty, owed to the principals to refrain from opposing their wishes, and a duty of
care, owed to those same persons to ensure their investments were sound. The court
pointed out that, while the beneficiaries opposed a sale, the trustee argued that he
had a duty to diversify the investments and that the market for the stocks was
favorable at the time. Id. The trustee expressed concern that he could face liability
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3.

The business judgment rule
Finally, the notion that courts are more concerned about harm
inflicted on the principal in violation of the duty of loyalty than about
promoting the principal’s well-being consistent with the duty of care
is reflected through the application of the business judgment rule,
which sits at the intersection of the duties of loyalty and care. Courts
applying the business judgment rule look first to whether the
directors have violated the duty of loyalty. Has there been fraud or
self-dealing? If not, courts presume the director has exercised
374
informed business judgment, consistent with his duty of care.
If,
however, a court finds a director violated his duty of loyalty, through
self-dealing or other improper actions, the court will find the director
liable for a breach of fiduciary duty without further inquiry into the
reasonableness of his actions under the duty of care.
This point is now codified in the Delaware General Corporation
Law. Section 102(b)(7) provides that a company’s certificate of
incorporation may contain a provision limiting a director’s liability
for a breach of fiduciary duty as long as the provision does not limit
375
liability for breach of the duty of loyalty or good faith. The business
376
judgment rule does not protect actions taken in bad faith. And bad
faith is not mere negligence, rather, it implies “the conscious doing
of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity . . . a
377
state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.”
Thus, as long as the director has not acted to harm another—a
breach of the duty of loyalty—his liability for a breach of the duty of
care may be limited.
In each of the three areas examined—attorney-client relations,
responsibilities of financial firms, and duties of directors and
trustees—a common theme emerges: courts are more concerned
with potential harm to a fiduciary’s principal than with inadequate
to certain beneficiaries who were then infants if he failed to diversify, and he offered
to refrain from selling the shares only if he would be indemnified against loss
resulting from such a claim. Id. The court, however, was far more concerned that
the trustee not act contrary to the wishes of the beneficiaries than that he act to
increase incrementally the benefits to the infants. Id. The court said, “Our trustee,
apparently, is not alarmed over liability for selling the stock against the protest of a
large majority of our wards, and without indemnity against personal loss.” Id.
374. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
375. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
376. In re Croton River Club, Inc., 52 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Wash.
Bancorp. v. Said, 812 F. Supp. 1256, 1269 (D.D.C. 1993) (lack of good faith requires
an allegation that the decision was motivated by self-interest).
377. Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, II, L.P., 624
A.2d 1199, 1208 n.16 (Del. 1993) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 337 (5th ed.
1983)).

LABY.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

2004]

2/4/2005 3:36:12 PM

RESOLVING CONFLICTS OF DUTY

149

stewardship or other violations of the duty of care. In each case,
when faced with a conflict of duty owed to multiple principals, courts
preserve the duty of loyalty over the duty of care. The theme is
persistent. It presents itself not only in the case law, but also in the
Restatement’s rules on consenting to attorneys’ conflicts, in
procedures established by financial firms, and in the business
judgment rule for company directors. None of this should come as a
surprise. The theme is based on the difference between duties of
loyalty and care, which itself is rooted in the difference between
Kant’s perfect and imperfect duties.
CONCLUSION
While duties of loyalty generally do not conflict with other duties of
loyalty, and while conflicting duties of care typically only raise issues
of competing resources, the fiduciary’s duty of loyalty can conflict
with the duty of care leaving her boxed into a corner. Approaches
taken by some courts on an ad hoc basis cannot be applied easily to
others.
A closer look at the cases, enriched by a deeper
understanding of the nature of the fiduciary duties of loyalty and
care, points to a consistent approach. When a fiduciary is faced with
a conflict, because acting to benefit one principal would result in
harm to another, courts generally hold that the fiduciary should
refrain from acting. In such cases, a breach of the duty of care is
treated more leniently than a breach of the duty of loyalty. This
explains why the duty of confidentiality trumps the duty to provide a
more effective defense or provide better investment advice. The
principal’s first claim is that the fiduciary must refrain from causing
harm; a claim to the performance of positive acts is secondary. At its
core, the approach is self-evident. “Do no harm” is the clarion call of
every fiduciary.

